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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
MIKE CORY BARBER, : Case No. 20060663-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (2008). See Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, Commitment). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION 
Issue 1: Whether private counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel when 
he failed to investigate the existence of expert testimony to interpret the medical records. 
Standard of Review: Where an ineffective assistance claim is "first raised on direct 
appeal," this Court will review it "as a matter of law." State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 354 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); see State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26, ffi[39-43, 1 3 5 p - 3 d 8 6 4-
Preservation: Ineffective assistance of counsel is an "exception[J to the 
preservation rule." State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, f l , 46 P.3d 230. 
Issue 2: Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied private 
counsel's motion to withdraw as counsel and/or motion for a continuance. 
Standard of Review: "It is well-established that the granting of a continuance is 
discretionary with the trial judge." State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408, 413 (Utah 1993) 
(citation omitted). Likewise, the granting of a motion to withdraw as counsel is 
discretionary. See State v. Pursifell 746 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). A trial 
court abuses its discretion if denying a motion "result[s] in a violation of a defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Cabututan, 861 P.2d at 413. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 150-54; 430:16-17, where the trial 
court denied private counsel's motions. Moreover, this issue addresses ineffective 
assistance, which is an "exception[] to the preservation rule." Cram, 2002 UT 37 at <|J4. 
Issue 3: Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted prejudicial 
photographs in violation of rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Standard of Review: "A trial court's ruling under rule 403 is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ^47, 52 P.3d 1210 (citation omitted), cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 1172(2003). 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. Prior to trial, private counsel objected to 
"any evidence relative to bruising" because it is "highly prejudicial to my client," and the 
trial court denied the motion under rule 403 because the "probative value" of bruising 
evidence was "substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice." R. 431:2-4. 
Thereafter, private counsel objected to State's Exhibits 10 through 22 and 26 because 
they "are quite gruesome" and "they tend to inflame more than inform." R. 431:65, 152-
54, 158-59. lie also objected to State's Exhibit 33 because "it's so inflammatory. I mean 
this is a gruesome photograph for anybody and for the other reasons that Fve stated that I 
just don't think bruising has anything to do with the case in general." R. 432:334. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following are determinative of the issues on appeal: U.S. Const, amend. VI; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 (2003); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Utah R. App. P. 23B; Utah R. 
Evid. 403. Their text is provided in full in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Barber was charged with two counts of child abuse after a child, Dominick, 
suffered injuries on February 28 and March 2, 2005. R. 1-4; 290A-C. Barber's defense 
was that Dominick's injuries "were the result of accidental trauma." R. 530:38. 
Specifically, the injuries were caused by two accidental falls—the first when he "jumped 
from a couch" and fell on "the brick fireplace," and the second when he fell "in the 
bathtub" and "hit his head." R. 530:4. Initially, Barber was represented by the Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Association (LDA). R. 29; 38; 530:37. 
A preliminary hearing was held on May 26, 2005. R. 43-44; 49; 429. There, the 
State called Officer Jason Hauer to testify that the doctors who treated Dominick after the 
March 2 incident said his injuries were inconsistent with a fall in the bathtub. R. 429:55. 
The State also called Linda Lewis, a family nurse practitioner, to give her expert opinion 
that Dominick's injuries were inconsistent with a "household fall." R. 429:92-93. First, 
she said it was "highly unlikely" that the head trauma resulted from a fall in a bathtub 
because it would have required force like that sustained in a car accident at 30 to 35 miles 
per hour. R. 429:80, 93, 98. Second, she said that Dominick had bruises in protected 
areas that were inconsistent with accidental injuries. R. 429:82, 84-85, 105. Third, she 
identified a bruise on the shoulder as a bite mark and said it was likely caused by abuse 
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because Dominick's sister denied biting him. R. 429:105. Fourth, she said it was 
possible that Dominick fractured his right arm and collarbone at the same time that he 
fractured his left arm, but it was likely, if he had, that he would have indicated pain in 
these areas, especially the collarbone. R. 429:109, 111. Rather, the fractures were likely 
inflicted because undiagnosed fractures are "suspicious for abuse." R. 429:88. 
On August 23, 2005, the State filed notice of its intent to call nine experts, 
including Dr. Marion Walker, Dr. Karen Hansen, and Linda Lewis, F.N.P., to "testify as 
to the victim's injuries" and "that the injuries are inconsistent with accidental injuries as 
described by the defendant but consistent with child abuse." R. 50-53; 56-57. 
On January 27, 2006, LDA filed notice of its intent to call Dr. Robert Rothfeder 
"as an expert witness to testify" at Barber's trial "as to the alleged victim's injuries." R. 
110; 530:40-41; see Addendum C. LDA also submitted Dr. Rothfeder's Curriculum 
Vitae, which contained his contact information. R. 112-25; 530:40-41. Thereafter, LDA 
withdrew because Barber "hired private counsel." R. 131-32; 137-39; 530:39-40. 
On February 13, 2006, private counsel entered an appearance of counsel. R. 131-
32, 137-39. Private counsel filed a motion to continue the jury trial scheduled for 
February 28, 2006, and the trial court granted private counsel's motion. R. 133-35. 
On March 7, 2006, the State filed notice of its intent to call three additional 
experts to "testify as to the victim's injuries." R. 140-42. It also provided Curriculum 
Vitae for several experts, including Dr. Walker. R. 140. The State provided additional 
Curriculum Vitae on March 16, 2006. R. 145-46. And, on April 17, 2006, it filed its 
Witness and Exhibit List, including Dr. Walker, Dr. Hansen, and Lewis. R. 246-48. 
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On March 22, 2006, private counsel moved to withdraw because Barber was "not 
able to sustain" the legal fees and wanted "to go back to [LDA] for representation/' and 
private counsel had "been quite ill lately" and had "been in the doctor's office more than 
[he had] been in [his] office." R. 150-51; 430:16; see Addendum D. The trial court 
denied this motion and private counsel's motion to continue. R. 152-54; 430:17. 
A jury trial was held April 18, 19, and 21, 2006. R. 291-95; 328-29; 431-33. In 
his opening statement, private counsel said the jury should acquit because Dominick's 
injuries were caused by two accidental falls—the first when he jumped off the couch and 
fell on the fireplace, and the second when he fell in the bathtub. R. 431:25-30. 
At trial, the State called three experts to testify that Dominick's injuries were 
inconsistent with accidental falls, and admitted photographs of the bruising in Exhibits 10 
through 22, 26 and 33. R. 431-33; see Addendum E. The trial court overruled private 
counsel's rule 403 objection to the exhibits. R. 431:2-4, 65, 152-54, 158-59; 432:334. 
Following deliberations, the jury found Barber not guilty on count one (the 
February 28 incident) and guilty on count two (the March 2 incident). R. 338; 433:487, 
On June 26, 2006, the trial court sentenced Barber to serve one to fifteen years in prison 
and ran the sentence "consecutive to any other convictions that he has." R. 383-84; 
430:30. On July 14, 2006, Barber filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 393-94. On August 
29, 2006, the trial court granted private counsel's motion to withdraw as counsel. R. 407-
08. The trial court appointed LDA on October 2, 2006. R. 413-14. 
On April 13, 2007, LDA filed a motion pursuant to rule 23B of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure to remand for supplementation of the record on appeal. R. 438-88. 
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This Court granted Barber's motion. R. 434. A rule 23B hearing was held on December 
14, 2007, where Barber called Monte Sleight (his LDA attorney), private counsel, and Dr. 
Rothfeder to testify. R. 515-16; 523; 530. Following the hearing, the trial court held: 
Mr. Barber did not have inadequate counsel. I remember this case very 
specifically. Mr. Smith did a good job, in fact, he did a better job than I expected 
having known Mr. Smith for some 30 years. He presented the exact same defense 
Mr. Sleight testified that he would have presented. He called many witnesses. He 
cross examined all of the State's experts very thoroughly on the issue of whether 
these injuries could have been caused accidentally and I don't believe there's any 
way in the world that the jury could have reached a different verdict because Dr. 
Rothfeder or a similar expert opined in any way similar to what Dr. Rothfeder 
testified to today. 
R. 530:64-65; see Addendum F. Thereafter, the trial court issued Findings of Fact: 
1. The State's expert testimony regarding the force behind the boy's 
injuries from three expert witnesses that the child's injuries were caused from 
force greater than that which would result in accidental falls was overwhelming, 
consistent and not equivocal. 
2. At trial, the State further presented evidence demonstrating defendant's 
course of conduct amounted to battery. 
3. Defense counsel did a thorough and competent job representing the 
defendant at trial. 
4. At trial, defense counsel: 
(a) Thoroughly covered the issue of whether the boy's injuries might 
have been caused by accidental falls on both direct and cross-examination. 
Defense counsel questioned the experts on cross-examination about the 
possibility that the injuries may have resulted from accidental falls and 
rough play and biting by the child's sister. The cross-examination elicited 
sufficient doubt in the minds of the jury to conclude the defendant was not 
guilty of one of the charges against him. 
(b) Because defendant could not afford to hire an expert despite 
wanting to, defense counsel called eight character witnesses to testify as to 
defendant's character around children. 
(c) Defense counsel's cross-examination showed that he had fulfilled 
his duty to make reasonable investigations into the possibility 1hat the 
child's injuries were sustained from some other source than battery by the 
defendant. 
5. At the evidentiary hearing, the Court heard testimony from the 
following: 
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(a) David K. Smith, defendant's trial attorney, who testified that he 
wanted to hire an expert at trial, but could not afford to do so. 
(b) Dr. Robert K. Rothfeder. 
(i) Dr, Rothfeder testified on direct examination that in his 
expert opinion the child's injuries could have resulted from the 
trauma of a fall; it was possible that all three broken bones in the 
child's arms and clavicle could have resulted from the same 
accidental fall; that the mark on the child's right shoulder might have 
been caused by the child's sister; and that Dr. Rothfeder was 
available to testify at trial, that he is easy to find because he had not 
moved or changed his address between the time LDA contacted him 
about testifying at trial and the actual trial. Dr. Rothfeder presented 
no expert report. 
1. 525-27; see Addendum F. The trial court also issued Conclusions of Law: 
1. The Court finds defense counsel thoroughly addressed the issues relevant 
to defendant's defense despite not being able to hire an expert and that he made 
thorough and reasonable investigations and decisions based upon his professional 
judgment, which made calling an expert unnecessary. The Court finds that Dr. 
Rothfeder's evidence was not as credible as the State's evidence, was not 
compelling and didn't rise to the level of effectively controverting the State's 
evidence, and that therefore calling Dr. Rothfeder or another expert with similar 
testimony would have made no difference in the outcome of the trial. 
2. In the evidentiary hearing, the defendant did not show that his trial 
counsel's actions were not based properly on choices made by the defendant and 
information supplied by defendant. 
3. The evidence demonstrated defendant's inability to afford to hire an 
expert, which governed defense counsel's decision not to call any such expert. 
Under the circumstances, this was a reasonable decision. 
4. The Court does not agree with LDA's assertion that given this financial 
constraint, defense counsel should have moved to have LDA reappointed. 
Defense counsel respected defendant's decision not to have LDA defend him and 
made the strategic choice to pursue defendant's case in the manner set forth above. 
R. 527-28; see Addendum F. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The State's Evidence Regarding the February 28 Incident. 
On February 28, 2005, Barber was babysitting his girlfriend's children—two-year-
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old Dominick and four-year-old Anastasia—while his girlfriend, Jena V, was at work. R. 
431:46, 49, 53, 78. Between 10:00 and 10:30 am, Barber called Jena V and said that the 
children had been playing in the front room and he had been downstairs doing laundry 
when he "heard a thud" and Anastasia "crying for him." R. 431:54. When he got 
upstairs, Anastasia "told him that [Dominick] had jumped from the couch to the 
fireplace." R. 431:54. Dominick "had hit his face and [J his nose was bleeding" so 
Barber had "wiped him up" and "was going to lay him down." R. 431:55-56. 
Later, Jena V's sister-in-law, Sieanna Hokama, came to the house. R 431:98. 
When she asked about Dominick, Barber said he "was laying in bed, that he had been 
jumping on the couch" and "had fallen onto the fireplace." R. 431:99. Hokama visited 
Dominick and noticed that his arm "was swollen" and "bruised." R. 431:104. She 
concluded "that his arm was broken" and told Barber to call Jena V. R. 431:100, 103-04. 
After Barber called Jena V, he and Jena V took Dominick to the hospital. R. 
431:104-05. Jena V testified that while they were at the hospital, Barber "was in and out 
of the room saying he had to smoke" or "call his sister, his mother." R. 431:96. The 
doctors gave Dominick a prescription for pain medication, x-rayed his left arm, and 
determined it was broken. R. 431:58, 84. Dominick's lip was also cut and he had bruises 
on his right shoulder and his lower back. R. 431:58-59. When Jena V asked the doctors 
about the bruises, they said "he could have fell and rolled." R. 431:85. When Jena V 
asked the children how Dominick injured himself, they said that "he fell and hit the 
fireplace." R. 431:92, 96-97. The doctors did not x-ray Dominick's right arm or 
collarbone. R. 431:83. The next day, Jena V stayed home from work and noticed that 
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"Dominick didn't want [her] to leave him in the room with just [Barber]." R. 431:60-61. 
B. The State's Evidence Regarding the March 2 Incident. 
Early on March 2, 2005, Barber and the children took Jena V to work. R. 431:60-
61, 63, 86. They then briefly visited Barber's mother, Rose Marie Barber, and a Rite Aid 
store. R. 431:63, 86, 109, 111; 432:369-70. Ivy Owens, a Rite Aid employee, testified 
that at approximately 9:00 am, she heard flapping" noises and a "child crying." R. 
431:109, 111, 113-14. When she went to look, she saw Barber holding a little boy and a 
little girl standing next to him. R. 431: 109, 111, 113-14, 126. While she watched, 
Barber "hit" the boy "across the head or the neck." R. 431:109, 111, 113-14, 126. Later, 
Barber "came up" to the cash register, looked "at the back of the boy's neck" and said, 
"What in the hell is this? What's going on here?" R. 431:115-16. He also "motioned to 
the little girl like this, shhh," and said to Owens, "'You don't think that I would' —and 
then stopped." R. 431:117. Barber and the children then left. R. 431:127. 
Between 10:30 and 11:00 am, Barber called Jena V and "said Dominick slipped 
and fell in the bathtub and he's not responding." R. 431:63, 90. He said that he did not 
sec Dominick fall because he "went to get a towel and he heard a thud." R. 431:90. 
While on the phone, Barber said Dominick's "name twice" and, when Jena V did not 
hear Dominick respond, she told Barber to call 9-1-1. R. 431:64, 90-91. 
When the emergency crew arrived at 10:55 am, Barber answered the door. R. 
431:182; 432:206, 230. Rohn Freeman testified that Barber appeared "nervous." R. 
431:183. He was "pacing back and forth, he was talking quickly," and he "had beaded 
sweat on his forehead." R. 431:183. Jacob Harmer said that Barber "seemed extremely 
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anxious," but that was not unusual given the circumstances. R. 432:206. 
Barber said that Dominick "slipped in the tub" while he was "out of the room" 
doing laundry, and that he "heard a loud thud." R. 431:190-91; 432:210, 217, 227. 
Aaron Nelson said that he "tried to" get "some more detail," "but the final result was that 
it had just happened prior to the call and that he had fallen in the tub." R. 432:227-28, 
233. Harmer, who observed the questioning, described Barber as "very distracted" and 
said that he "would not directly answer the question." R. 432:219-20, 227-28. 
The emergency crew found Dominick lying unconscious on the floor in the front 
room. R. 431:184; 432:207, 225-27. He was wearing a shirt, a diaper, and possibly 
pants; his clothes, hair, and cast were dry. R. 431:184, 190-91; 432:208, 221-22, 225-26, 
233-34, 250-51. The emergency crew thought this was "a little odd" so Harmer went to 
check the bathtub. R. 432:207, 225. He said that there was "about two to three inches" 
of "cool," "clear" water in the bathtub. R. 432:211. The "floor was dry" and there were 
no bath toys in the tub. R. 432:214-15. Meanwhile, the emergency crew treated 
Dominick and life-flighted him to Primary Children's Medical Center. R. 431:187, 195-
98; 432:208-09, 213, 218-19, 225-26, 236-45, 248-50. 
Police officers also arrived on the scene. R. 432:287, 293, 296, 310. Officer 
Travis Pearce said the bathtub "looked like it had recently been used" because there was 
a "fresh residue" of water, "some soap," and a "scrubber" in the tub; and there was 
"water just on the outside of the tub, as if you were to step out of the tub." R 432:287, 
290, 299. lie also "noticed a bundle of towels wrapped up on the floor" in the 
downstairs, northwest corner of the house. R. 432:291-92, 302. The towels were "very" 
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wet. R. 432:291, 302. In addition, Officer Jason Hauer observed "[a] purplish towel" 
and a "block of ice" on the kitchen table, and "two or three rags" lying by the kitchen 
sink that appeared "to have blood" on them. R. 432:322, 363. 
Officer Hauer interviewed Anastasia. R. 432:323, 354-55. She said "that 
Dominick was jumping on the couch and fell and hit the fireplace." R. 432:326, 356, 
358. She also said, "'Sometimes Dominick tries to hit me.'" R. 432:357. And she 
mentioned that she and Dominick were "in an automobile accident" and "were crying." 
R. 432:361. When Officer Hauer redirected her attention to "the fall in the bathtub," she 
said that Dominick was taking a bath and "fell asleep and he wouldn't wake up." R. 
432:326,357-59. "Mike yelled,'Dominick! Dominick! Dominick!' And he wouldn't 
wake up." R. 432:326, 357-59. When Officer Hauer asked Anastasia if Barber ever hurt 
her, she "said no." R. 432:360. When he asked her if Dominick got in trouble that day, 
she said that Dominick was "kind of not listening to my Mike." R. 432:360. 
Officer Hauer also interviewed Barber. R. 432:311-12, 361. Barber said that he 
"drew a bath for" Dominick and "[w]ent downstairs to do some laundry." R. 432:312. 
While downstairs, he "heard a thud, came running upstairs and found Dominick laying 
against... the back of the tub, head out of water, up against the slanted part." R. 
432:312. Dominick "wasn't responding." R. 432:313. Barber got him "out of the tub, [] 
dried him off and got him dressed" because Barber did not want him "to be cold." R. 
432:313-14,362. Barber then "called Jena V" and "9-1-1." R. 432:313-14. He said that 
he "was very anxious to get up to the hospital" and would "head right up." R. 432:314. 
After the interview, Officer Hauer went to the hospital, learned "more 
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information" about Dominick's injuries, and began to "look for [Barber] to place him 
under arrest." R. 432:315. Barber never went to the hospital. R. 432:315. He was 
arrested "[a] little over a month" later. R. 432:315. At the time of his arrest, he had 
shaved his head and grown a beard, and "[h]e was a lot skinnier." R. 432:317. Officer 
Hauer interviewed him again. R. 432:315. During the interview, Officer Hauer asked 
him about the incident at the Rite Aid and he said that he "had never hit Dominick." R. 
432:316. Officer Hauer also asked him why he did not go to the hospital and he said 
"that he had just been to jail and he didn't want to go to jail again." R. 432:365. 
C. The State's Expert Testimony Regarding the Cause of Dominick's Injuries. 
First, Linda Lewis, a family nurse practitioner at Primary Children's Medical 
Center who examined Dominick after the March 2 incident, testified that one of the 
bruises looked like a bite mark, that the bruises on the abdomen and rib cage could have 
been finger marks, and that the bruise on the left ear indicated that Dominick may have 
"been pulled by the ear." R. 431:139-40, 144. In addition, Lewis testified that the 
abrasion on the back of the head came from one injury or blow, R. 431:157; and that the 
presence of fluid in one of Dominick's eyes indicated that he was either hit in one eye or 
fell on it. R. 430:177. In all, Lewis believed the bruises were not accidental because 
many were in "protected spaces." R. 431:160-61. It was her opinion that the totality of 
the injuries was "not consistent with a single injury." R. 431:177. 
Cross-examining Lewis, private counsel established that the fractures in the right 
arm and collarbone could have been up to ten days old. R. 431:169. He also established 
evidence that helped the State's case: none of the bruises were caused by the emergency 
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crew or the surgery, R. 431:166-67; the bruises on the cheeks and right shoulder were 
likely not caused by the fall on the fireplace because they were "too patterned" and the 
left arm "would have taken the impact," R. 431:174-75; the bruise on the left ear would 
have required a "[p]retty hard" grab or pinch, R. 431:169, 175-76; and the bruise on the 
right shoulder was "reminiscent of a bite mark." R. 431:169, 175-76. 
Second, Dr. Karen Hansen, a pediatrician who evaluated Dominick while he was 
at Primary Children's Medical Center, opined that the totality of the injuries could not 
have been caused by a fall in a bathtub. R. 432:267. She noted that she had never seen 
injuries like Dominick's in cases where toddlers fell in bathtubs or from couches, R. 
432:267; and observed that some of the bruises were in "protected areas," indicating that 
they were not a result of "toddler-type accidents." R. 432:259. She also testified that the 
left arm fracture likely resulted "from a direct blow with bending," R. 432:260, while the 
lower right arm fracture was consistent with the arm being "grabbed and twisted," R. 
432:263, and the left collarbone could have been broken by a fall or a blow. R. 432:261. 
Based on this information, she concluded it would likely have taken two blows or falls to 
break both the collarbone and arm. R. 432:261. She also said that tc[s]urprise fractures 
are always concerning for an inflicted and abusive cause." R. 432:266. 
Cross-examining Dr. Hansen, private counsel established that the fractures in the 
right arm and collarbone could have been up to ten days old, R. 432:272; that the bruises 
on the chest "looked like fingermarks," but it was "possible" they were something else, 
R. 432:271-72; and that the bruise on the right shoulder looked like "a bite mark," but 
could have been caused by an object that "had an edge so that the center was not 
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bruised." R. 432:283. In addition, he reaffirmed evidence about the left arm fracture that 
supported the State's case: it would have taken "two hands" to inflict; the fracture was 
likely caused when someone "grasped and bent" the arm, R. 432:275; and the person who 
inflicted the fracture "would have to be trying" to cause injury. R. 432:276. 
Third, Dr. Marion Walker, the attending physician at Primary Children's Medical 
Center who performed Dominick's May 2 operation, testified that the head injury was the 
"kind" that required "a very violent blow to the head." R. 432:331, 339. A "fall in the 
tub," even a fall toward the faucet, could not "generate the kind of energy necessary" to 
cause the injury. R. 432:339-40. The force necessary to create the injury would require 
"a high speed automobile accident" or "a fall from a second or third-floor window." R. 
432:341, 344. Rather, the injury was consistent with "being struck violently in the back 
of the head" with "something, like a baseball bat." R. 432:341, 344. Consequently, 
Walker's opinion was that the head injury was inflicted because "the story, as told, being 
in the bath tub, does not explain the force necessary to create this injury." R. 432:351. 
Dr. Walker also testified that Dominick had bruises on "his chest and his back, which is 
very rare for a child to obtain a bruise from normal falls." R. 432:332. 
Cross-examining Dr. Walker, private counsel established evidence that supported 
the State's case: Dr. Walker would not expect neck or other injury to accompany the head 
trauma if someone struck Dominick in the back of the head, R. 432:344; Dominick would 
have been unconscious "immediately" or "quickly" after the injury, R. 432:345; and the 
injuries "will surely lead to some learning problems" for Dominick. R. 432:346. In 
addition, private counsel reaffirmed information that supported the State's case: the force 
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necessary to cause the head injury would have been "violent force," such as being struck 
in the head "with something, like a baseball bat or some hard object; being involved in a 
high speed automobile accident; being an auto-pedestrian hit by a car." R. 432:344. 
D. The Defense Presented By Private Counsel. 
Private counsel did not call an expert to counter the State's expert testimony. R. 
431-33. Instead, he called Rose Marie Barber and seven other character witnesses to 
testify. R. 432:369-411. Rose Marie Barber testified that when Barber and the children 
visited her on March 2, Barber got Dominick a jacket because "it was chilly" and asked 
her to comb Dominick's hair. R. 432:370, 372. Dominick "was fine" and Barber was 
holding Dominick "when they left." R. 432:371. In addition, the character witnesses 
testified that Barber was good with children. R. 432:369-411. Private counsel also called 
Tracy Jensen, a former employee at the Department of Child and Family Services, to 
testify that she interviewed Barber and believed he was telling the truth. R. 432:412. 
The trial court allowed Jensen to testify about the answers that Barber gave during the 
interview but did not allow her to conclude whether he was telling the truth. R. 432:412. 
E. The Closing Arguments Presented By the State and Private Counsel. 
In closing, the State reminded the jury that "all three" experts "gave you the 
opinion that th[ese] w[ere] abusive injuries." R. 433:466. It also reiterated the experts' 
testimony that the injuries were "not consistent with an accident" and "could not have 
happened" the way Barber claims. R. 433:466-67. Specifically, it reminded the jury that 
"Dr. Walker said that the amount of trauma" needed "to do what this did in [Dominick's] 
head was equivalent to falling off a second story building or getting in a car accident." R. 
15 
433:466. "Remember, he said that he had never seen it happen from a fall in a tub." R. 
433:466. "A fall in a tub is . . . only a few feet. It is insufficient force." R. 433:466. 
Private counsel then argued that Barber was not the type of person to hurt kids and 
had no motive to hurt Dominick. R. 433:473, 481. To explain the fracture in Dominick's 
left arm, private counsel argued that Dominick and his older sister both said "that he 
jumped or fell off the couch and hit the fireplace." R. 433:470. Plus, the doctor that 
inspected Dominick's arm "thought" that Dominick "probably did hit pretty good, 
something like that, which is quite likely what happened " R. 433:471. To explain the 
fractures in Dominick's right arm and collarbone, private counsel argued: 
I think it's quite likely, though we don't know for sure, he may have actually 
fractured his collar bone at that time. And perhaps also the other arm, which 
wasn't so serious, the right arm, but there was a fractured arm. 
R. 433:471. Private counsel then identified Dominick's head injury as "the crux of this 
case," R. 433:472, and explained the head injury by arguing: 
Now, the doctor says . . . in my experience, it couldn't have happened by falling 
and hitting his head. Well, I grant you that's probably true, just falling in the tub, 
falling backwards and water was in it (inaudible) caused it; but if you hit your 
head on that metal, I'll bet it could happen and I'll bet that's what caused it. 
R. 433:477. Concluding, private counsel said, "So, it just makes sense that what caused 
that hematoma . . . was not my client, but his fall into that striation." R. 433:477. 
In rebuttal, the State again used the experts' testimony. It was "inconceivable" 
that a fall in the bathtub created the "substantial amount of force" necessary to cause the 
head injury. R. 433:481-82. "That's not the way the laws of physics react." R. 433:481-
82. The head injury "could not have occurred but by abuse. The explanations the 
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defendant gives are absolutely ridiculous." R. 433:484. Still referring to "the laws of 
physics that the experts have talked about," the State explained why the fractures to the 
right arm and collarbone could not have resulted from Dominick "falling on the fireplace, 
you absorb force and therefore, you decrease the likelihood that other things will be 
injured." R. 433:482, 485. "Remember, the doctor testified to break his collar bone, it 
would have had to have been some kind of a blow to the shoulder." R. 433:485. 
F. The Evidence Presented at the Rule 23B Hearing. 
At the rule 23B hearing, Barber called Monte Sleight, his LDA attorney, to testify. 
Sleight said that following the preliminary hearing, LDA "consulted with Dr. Robert 
Rothfeder." R. 530:38-39. After reviewing the case file, Dr. Rothfeder determined that 
the injuries were consistent with "a series of accidents." R. 530:39. Based on this 
opinion, LDA filed notice of its intent to call Dr. Rothfeder "as an expert at the trial." R. 
110; 530:40-41. LDA did not run this defense, however, because Barber hired private 
counsel. R. 530:39-40. When a defendant hires private counsel, LDA's "practice" is to 
"photocopy| | everything in the file and forward[] that to private counsel." R. 530:40. 
Sleight believed this practice was followed in Barber's case. R. 530:40-41. The notice of 
Dr. Rothfeder's testimony was also available in the trial court's file. R. 530:42. 
Barber also called private counsel to testify. See Addendum G. Private counsel 
said that he "[primarily" does "Worker's Comp and Social Security Disability" law, but 
he does "some criminal" and "other miscellaneous." R. 530:2. He prepared for Barber's 
trial by talking to "a number" of witnesses regarding Barber's good character. R. 238-43; 
530:7. He intended to call these witnesses at trial to show that Barber "was a good 
17 
person and had a love for children." R. 530:7. He also read most of the discovery, but 
did not read "a large stack" of medical files that he received "a day or two before trial." 
R. 530:5-6. He was not sure whether those files contained new information because he 
"didn't have the opportunity to go through them carefully." R. 530:6. 
Regarding expert testimony, private counsel testified that he "received papers" 
from LDA, but "wasn't aware" that LDA "had consulted with Dr. Robert Rothfeder." R. 
530:4-5. lie "did not" consult with Dr. Rothfeder or any other experts because "[t]here 
were no funds to do so." R. 530:5, 7-8. He did not seek funding from the court to hire an 
expert. R. 530:8. When asked if "an expert [would] have been helpful," he said, "Oh, 
very much so because obviously we knew the prosecution had . . . two prosecution 
witnesses that were experts and were going to testify regarding causation." R. 530:8. 
Finally, Barber called Dr. Rothfeder to testify. R. 530:10-35. Dr. Rothfeder said 
that at LDA's request, he reviewed the medical records, photographs, and investigative 
documents and formulated an expert opinion about Dominick's injuries. R. 530:10-11. 
First, it was "certainly possible" that a fall in the bathtub caused the head injury. 
R. 530:11-12. While it is "true" that the injury could have been inflicted, it is also true 
that it could have been caused by Dominick falling off the edge of the tub and hitting the 
"rail or another protruding surface on the tub or both." R. 530:24-25. 
Second, it was "possible" that all three fractures occurred in one incident. R. 
530:12. While it is "possible" that the fractures were inflicted, it is also possible that they 
were all "caused from jumping off the couch and falling onto the brick fireplace." R. 
530:11-12. Further, it is possible that Dominick did not complain about the fractures in 
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the right arm and clavicle "based on the amount of pain" he felt in his "left forearm." R. 
530:14. The left arm fracture was "significant" and would have caused "an awful lot of 
pain." R. 530:12-13. The other fractures were "less severe." R. 530:14. As an example, 
Dr. Rothfeder said that he has "seen situations where a patient came in with a history of a 
fall" and there was an "obvious . . . fracture of one wrist or forearm, that is swelling and 
deformity." R. 530:13-14. "The patient wasn't complaining of elsewhere at the time," 
but "several days later," the parent brought the patient back and x-rays revealed a "non-
displaced" fracture "on the other arm." R. 530:13-14. 
Third, Dominick had bruises on both his trunk and extremities and "some" of the 
bruises were "suspicious" because they were in protected areas. R. 530:22. But it is 
"possible" that the bruising was caused by Anastasia. R. 530:15. In particular, the bruise 
on the shoulder did not appear to be a bite mark, but if it was, then it was "possible" that 
it was caused by Anastasia. R. 530:15. Further, the bruise on the ear was not "likely 
from pinching or pulling," but was "consistent with an impact to the left ear." R. 530:20. 
Looking "at the totality of the circumstances," Dr. Rothfeder concluded that the 
injuries were "consistent with child abuse," but were also consistent with accidental falls. 
R. 530:32-35. "Consistent with means that. . . the explanation is a possible cause and in 
many circumstances one can make a list of causes that the findings are consistent with 
and we generally call that a differential diagnosis and there may be, usually are several 
items on that list." R. 530:33-34. To explain, Dr. Rothfeder said that he has seen 
"incredibly unusual injuries." R. 530:34-35. "Sometimes you'll have a document and 
history of something very impressive, someone falling out of second story window with 
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very little injury." R. 530:34. And other times, you see a "severe injury where there's 
documentation of what seems to be not extremely forceful trauma." R. 530:34-35. In 
particular, he has been suspicious of child abuse and then found out that the injuries were 
caused by an accident. R. 530:35. Thus, Dr. Rothfeder concluded that the "differential 
diagnosis for [Dominick's] injuries includes child abuse and . . . accidents." R. 530:35. 
Following Dr. Rothfeder's testimony, the State recalled its experts. R. 530:45-54. 
Now, Lewis testified that the injuries "were less likely from a household fall" and that 
she made her diagnosis of child abuse "with a reasonable degree of medical certainty." 
R. 530:45-46. But she also said that she could not "say absolutely" that "nothing else," 
such as accidental falls, caused the injuries. R. 530:46-47. Dr. Hansen testified that she 
"felt that [the] injuries were inflicted" and that she made her diagnosis of child abuse 
"with a reasonable degree of medical certainty." R. 530:53. But it is "perhaps not 
impossible" that his injuries "were caused by something other than abuse." R. 530:53-54. 
And Dr. Walker testified that the injuries were consistent with inflicted injury and that he 
made that diagnosis to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. R. 530:49-50. But he 
"would not say it's impossible that the injuries were caused by a fall in the bathtub, just 
that "it would be so extremely rare as to be remarkable." R. 530:51. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First, this Court should reverse for ineffective assistance. Private counsel's 
performance was deficient because he failed to adequately investigate the availability of 
expert testimony to support Barber's defense and to counter the State's expert testimony 
that accidental falls could not explain Dominick's injuries. Moreover, there was a 
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reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome for the defense but for private 
counsel's deficient performance because expert testimony was critical to the State's case. 
Second, this Court should reverse because the trial court abused its discretion by 
denying private counsel's motion to withdraw as counsel and/or for a continuance. 
Denying these motions resulted in a violation of Barber's right to counsel because he did 
not get his counsel of choice and private counsel provided ineffective assistance. 
Third, this Court should reverse because the trial court erred by admitting Exhibits 
10 through 22, 26 and 33. The exhibits were admitted to show bruising even though 
Barber did not challenge the bruising and bruising was not an element of the crime. 
Because the exhibits were graphic photographs of a two-year-old child shortly after 
surgery, their risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed their probative value. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PRIVATE COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE WHEN 
HE FAILED TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE THE AVAILABILITY 
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY TO SUPPORT BARBER'S DEFENSE 
The Sixth Amendment provides a defendant with the right to effective assistance 
of counsel at all stages of the prosecution, including the investigation. See State v. Hales, 
2007 UT 14,1J69, 152 P.3d 321. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), "setLs| 
forth the analytical framework for deciding ineffective assistance of counsel claims." 
State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted). 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under 
the Strickland test, "a defendant must show (1) that counsel's 
performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's 
deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that 
21 
the outcome of the trial would have been different" . . . . [I]n 
making this evaluation, the court must "indulge in the strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the 
defendant must overcome the presumption that under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered 
sound trial strategy." 
State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ^|23, 84 P.3d 1183 (citations omitted). In this case, private 
counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to adequately investigate, and this 
Court should reverse because but for the deficient performance there was a reasonable 
probability of a more favorable outcome. 
A. Private Counsel's Performance Was Deficient Because He Failed to 
Adequately Investigate the Availability of Expert Testimony. 
To prevail on the first prong of the Strickland test, the defendant must show '"that 
counsel's performance was deficient.'" State v. Eyre, 2008 UT 16, ^16, 179 P.3d 792 
(citation omitted). "An attorney's performance is deficient if 'counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment.'" Id. (citation omitted). In other words, "a defendant 'must identify 
specific acts or omissions demonstrating that counsel's representation failed to meet an 
objective standard of reasonableness.'" Montoya, 2004 UT 5 at |^24 (citation omitted). 
For example, in State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), defendant 
argued his counsel was ineffective for providing a defense of habitation instiuction that 
did not include "the statutory presumption" of reasonableness. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d at 
692. On appeal, this Court reversed because there was "no tactical explanation for 
requesting a defense of habitation instruction without inclusion of the beneficial 
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presumption." IcL Rather, it appeared "counsel merely overlooked the statutory 
presumption by failing to check the 'pocket-part' of the Utah Code." Id. 
Likewise, in Eyre, defendant argued his counsel was ineffective for "failing to 
object to the absence of a jury instruction listing the existence of a tax deficiency as an 
element of tax evasion." Eyre, 2008 UT 16 at [^18. On appeal, our supreme court held 
for the first time "that proof of a tax deficiency is an element of Utah's tax evasion 
statute." Id, at ^10-15. It then reversed for ineffective assistance because "counsel's 
failure to object to a jury instruction that did not alert the jury to every element of the 
crime . . . charged amounted to a deficient performance." Id. at ^|19. Compare State v. 
Mahi, 2005 UT App 494, ffi[19, 21, 125 P.3d 103 (affirming where it was "plausible" that 
counsel "did not accept the judge's offer to give a curative instruction" because "he did 
not want to draw further attention to the testimony"). 
To be effective, counsel must "'adequately investigate the underlying facts' of the 
case because investigation sets the foundation for counsel's strategic decisions about how 
to build the best defense." Hales, 2007 UT 14 at 1J69 (citations omitted). 
[Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts 
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and 
strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are 
reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional 
judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, 
counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91; see State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 356 (Utah 1996) 
(holding "'decision not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical decision'" (citation 
omitted)); State v. Huggins, 920 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (holding 
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'"counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision 
that makes particular investigations unnecessary'" (emphasis and citations omitted)); 
State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085, 1090 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ('"[T]he Sixth Amendment 
imposes on counsel a duty to investigate, because reasonably effective assistance must be 
based on professional decisions[,] and informed legal choices can be made only after 
investigation of options.'" (citation omitted)). 
If counsel does not adequately investigate the underlying facts of a 
case, including the availability of prospective defense witnesses, 
counsel's performance cannot fall within the "wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance." This is because a decision not to 
investigate cannot be considered a tactical decision. It is only after an 
adequate inquiry has been made that counsel can make a reasonable 
decision to call or not to call particular witnesses for tactical reasons. 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 1825 188 (Utah 1990) (internal footnote omitted). 
For example, in Hales, our supreme court reversed for ineffective assistance 
because the defense attorneys failed to "conduct an adequate investigation." Hales, 2007 
UT 14 at *|J69. In that case, defendant was convicted of murder based on the State's 
allegations that he shook a child "violently," causing brain injuries that ultimately led to 
the child's death. Id. at *|fl. The defense attorneys' performance was deficient because 
they failed "to hire a qualified expert to review the CT scans." Id at ^ |69. 
The CT scans were "critical to the State's case" because they were "the primary 
source of information regarding what happened to" the child. Id. at ^74. Using the CT 
scans, the State's expert "made crucial assertions regarding the cause, timing, and 
violence of the injury." Id. at [^76. In particular, he "opined that the global nature of the 
brain injury indicated that the injury was not caused by an impact, and that the force 
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required to cause the injuries to a baby's brain shown on the CT scans from shaking 
would be 'violent force"'; and "concluded that the injury to [the child] must have been 
nonaccidental and caused by shaken baby syndrome." Id. at ffi|76-77. 
"Despite the centrality of the CT scans . . . to the State's case," and the fact that 
"the defense's theory required the jury to disbelieve [the State's] interpretation of the CT 
scans," the defense attorneys did not hire an expert to review the CT scans "as part of 
their pretrial investigation." Id. at 1flJ78, 80. Thus, they performed deficiently, even 
though they hired another expert to support the defense, because their "failure to hire an 
expert to interpret the CT scans" amounted to inadequate investigation. IcL at ^82-83. 
Similarly, in this case, private counsel provided deficient performance when he 
failed to hire Dr. Rothfeder or another expert to counter the State's expert testimony that 
Dominick's injuries were inconsistent with accidental falls. As in Hales, expert 
interpretation of the medical records was "critical to the State's case." Hales, 2007 UT 
14 at l[j74. There were no eyewitnesses who could say that the injuries were caused by 
abuse, rather than by accidental falls. R. 429; 431-33. Thus, expert testimony regarding 
the injuries was "the primary source of information regarding what happened to" 
Dominick. Hales, 2007 UT 14 at 1174; see supra at Part I.B.; R. 429; 431-33. 
The State's intention to rely on expert testimony to prove the injuries were caused 
by abuse and not by accidental falls was clear prior to trial. It filed notice of its intent to 
call nine experts to testify that the "injuries [were] inconsistent with accidental injuries as 
described by the defendant but consistent with child abuse." R. 50-52; 56; 140-42. Also, 
at the preliminary hearing, its evidence of abuse came from Officer Hauer, who testified 
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that the doctors said Dominick's injuries were inconsistent with a fall in the bathtub, R. 
429:55; and Lewis, who testified that Dominick's injuries were consistent "with inflicted 
trauma" and inconsistent "with a simple household fall." R. 429:80, 92-93, 98. 
When preparing for trial, LDA recognized "the centrality" of expert testimony "to 
the State's case," and the fact that "the defense's theory required the jury to disbelieve" 
the State's expert testimony. Hales, 2007 UT 14 at 1fl|785 80. Accordingly, it consulted 
with Dr. Rothfeder. R. 530:38-39. After reviewing the file, Dr. Rothfeder formed the 
expert opinion that "one of the possible explanations for the injuries" was that they 
resulted from "a series of accidents." R. 530:39. This opinion contradicted the State's 
expert testimony and supported Barber's defense. Compare R. 530:10-35 with R. 50-52; 
56; 140-42; 429:55, 80, 92-93, 98. Thus, LDA filed notice of its intent to call Dr. 
Rothfeder to testify "as to the alleged victim's injuries." R. 110; 530:40-41. 
"Despite the centrality" of expert testimony "to the State's case," and the fact that 
"the defense's theory required the jury to disbelieve" the State's expert testimony, private 
counsel did not contact Dr. Rothfeder, review the file carefully enough to realize that Dr. 
Rothfeder had already developed an expert opinion in the case, or hire another expert to 
review the medical records "as part of [his] pretrial investigation." Hales, 2007 UT 14 at 
Y1R8, 80. When asked at the rule 23B hearing whether he recognized the need for expert 
testimony, private counsel said that expert testimony would have been very helpful 
"because obviously we knew the prosecution had . . . two prosecution witnesses that were 
experts and were going to testify regarding causation." R. 530:8. But he "did not" 
consult with any experts because "[t]here were no funds lo do so." R. 530:5. 7-8. He 
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reached this conclusion without seeking funds from the court to hire an expert. R. 530:8. 
Private counsel's decision not to pursue expert testimony because he believed 
Barber could not afford the fees was unreasonable. Utah law guarantees '"public 
assistance for expert witnesses" for any defendant who can establish "proof of necessity" 
and "indigence." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56,1(32, 4 P.3d 795. Rule 15(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure says, "Upon showing that a defendant is financially unable 
to pay the fees of an expert whose services are necessary for adequate defense, the 
witness fee shall be paid as if he were called on behalf of the prosecution." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 15(a). Interpreting rule 15(a), our supreme court has said that "regardless of the 
cost, if the resources are necessary for a complete defense, the court must approve them." 
State v. Carreno, 2006 UT 59, ^18, 144 P.3d 1152. 
In this case, there was a reasonable probability that Barber would have received 
funding to hire an expert if private counsel had requested it. First, the record shows that 
Barber was "financially unable to pay the fees for an expert." Utah R. Qjm. P. 15(a). 
The trial court found Barber indigent. R. 21-26. Although Barber hired private counsel, 
private counsel moved to withdraw because Barber was "not able to sustain" the legal 
fees. R. 150-51; 430:16. And private counsel specifically testified at the rule 23B 
hearing that he "did not" consult with any experts because Barber had "no funds to do 
so." R. 530:5, 7-8. Second, as discussed above and in section I.B., expert testimony was 
"necessary for adequate defense." Utah R. Crim. P. 15(a); see supra at Part LB. 
"[A] decision not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical decision." 
Templin, 805 P.2d at 188. "It is only after an adequate inquiry has been fciade that 
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counsel can make a reasonable decision to call or not to call particular witnesses for 
tactical reasons." Id Accordingly, private counsel should have investigated whether 
expert testimony existed, informed Barber and the trial court that expert testimony 
existed, and asked to have LDA reappointed or moved to receive funds to hire an expert. 
See Utah R. Crim. P. 15(a). Thus, this Court should reverse because, as in Hales, private 
counsel's "failure to hire an expert" to review Dominick's medical records amounted to 
inadequate investigation. Hales, 2007 UT 14 at 1flf82-83. 
B. But For Private Counsel's Deficient Performance, There Was a Reasonable 
Likelihood of a More Favorable Outcome for the Defense. 
"[I]f counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful 
adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes 
the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable." United States v. Crortic, 466 U.S. 
648, 659 (1984). For example, in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), the trial court 
prevented defendant from cross-examining a witness about the fact that he was on 
probation at the time that he identified defendant. Davis, 415 U.S. at 311-12. Because 
"the accuracy and truthfulness of [the witness's] testimony were key elements in the 
State's case," the Supreme Court held that defendant was "denied the right of effective 
cross-examination which 'would be constitutional error of the first magnitude and no 
amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it.'" IdL at 317-18 (citation omitted); 
see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 56-58 (1932) (reversing without examining 
prejudice where counsel was appointed on first day of trial); Quintero v. Bell, 368 F.3d 
892, 893 (6l1 Cir. 2004) (reversing without examining prejudice where counsel allowed 
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"jurors who had convicted petitioner's co-conspirators" to be seated (citation omitted)); 
State v. Curry, 2006 UT App 390, HU9-10, 147 P.3d 483 (reversing without examining 
prejudice where counsel did not appear at suppression hearing due to serious illness). 
This Court need not examine prejudice. Before trial, private counsel admitted that 
he had been too ill to adequately prepare for trial. R. 150-51; 430:16. Thus, even though 
he recognized that expert testimony interpreting the medical records was central to the 
case, see supra at Part I.A, he did not read all of the medical records, consult an expert, 
review the file sufficiently to realize that an expert had already been consulted, or request 
funding to hire an expert. R. 530:4-8. Because expert testimony interpreting the medical 
records was a "key element[] in the State's case," this Court should hold that private 
counsel*s complete failure to investigate the availability of expert testimony or even to 
completely read the medical records was "'constitutional error of the first magnitude'" 
that "'no amount of showing of want of prejudice5" can cure. Davis, 415 U.S. at 317-18. 
Even if this Court declines to presume prejudice, it should reverse because private 
counsel's failure to investigate prejudiced Barber. In Hales, our supreme court held that 
the defense attorneys' failure "to hire a qualified expert to review the CT scans" was 
prejudicial because the CT scans were "critical to the State's case." Hales, 2007 UT 14 at 
YIJ69, 74. It was apparent from the record that expert testimony to counter the State's 
interpretation of the CT scans existed, and, if offered, would have presented a competing 
interpretation of the CT scan evidence that could have swayed the jury. IcL at ^87-92. 
In particular, competing expert testimony "would have likely cast doubt on the State's 
ability to rule out theories that the injury may have been accidental." IcL at ^91. Because 
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the State's case "hinged on the interpretation of the CT scans to show a nonaccidental 
injury," our supreme court concluded that there was a reasonable probability "that the 
jury could have been swayed by a medical expert able to interpret the CT scans and 
challenge [the State's expert's| critical findings regarding the timing, cause, and violence 
of the injuries." Id. at ^|92. Thus, the court reversed because the "failure to investigate 
had a 'pervasive effect' on the key evidence at trial." Id. (citation omitted). 
Similarly, in this case, there was a reasonable probability that the result would 
have been different but for private counsel's failure to adequately investigate Barber's 
case. There were no eyewitnesses who could say that Dominick's injuries were caused 
by abuse, rather than by accidental falls. R. 429; 431-33. Thus, expert testimony 
interpreting the medical records was "the primary source of information regarding what 
happened to" Dominick. Hales, 2007 UT 14 at f74; R. 429; 431-33. 
At trial, the State's experts "made crucial assertions regarding the cause, timing, 
and violence" of the injuries. Hales, 2007 UT 14 at ^76-77. As demonstrated below, 
they "opined that the global nature of the brain injury" and the other injuries "indicated 
that the injur[iesj w[ere] not caused by" accidental falls; opined "that the force required 
to cause" the head injury "would be 'violent force'" and would be more force than a fall 
in a bathtub could generate; and concluded that the injuries "must have been 
nonaccidental and caused by" abuse. Hales, 2007 UT 14 at Uf76-77; R. 431-33. 
All three experts excluded accidental falls as possible sources for the injuries. 
First, Lewis testified that the injuries were "not consistent with a single injury" and that 
studies show "that simple falls don't result in life-threatening injuries." R. 431:177-78. 
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Second, Dr. Hansen testified that the injuries could not have been caused by accidental 
falls and noted that she had never seen injuries like Dominick's in cases where toddlers 
fell in bathtubs or off couches. R. 432:267. Further, she opined that it would likely have 
taken two blows or falls to cause the bone fractures, R. 432:261; that the right arm 
fracture was from a twisting motion and that she would not expect Dominick's right side 
to be injured if he fell on his left side, R. 432:263-64; and that "surprise fr&ctures are 
always concerning for" abuse. R. 432:266. Third, Dr. Walker testified that the head 
injury required "a very violent blow to the head," and a "fall in the tub" could not 
"generate the kind of energy necessary" to cause the injury. R. 432:331, 339-40, 341, 
344, 351. He also opined that the force necessary would have been the amount of force 
generated by "striking a child in the head with . . . a baseball bat," "being jinvolved in a 
high speed automobile accident," being "hit by a car," or falling "from a second or third-
floor window." R. 432:341, 344. All three experts also opined that the bruises indicated 
abuse. R. 431:160-61; 432:259, 332. In particular, Lewis and Dr. Hansen opined that the 
bruise on the ear was "indicative of pulling" or pinching, R. 431:143; 432:257; and that 
the bruise on the right shoulder appeared to be a bite mark. R. 431:148-50; 432:258. 
It was possible to attack the Slate's expert testimony. R. 530. If private counsel 
had retained Dr. Rothfeder or another expert, he could have presented expert testimony to 
contradict the crucial points made by the State's experts and to support Barber's defense 
that the injuries were caused by a "series of accidents." R. 530:10-35, 39. This is 
demonstrated by Dr. Rothfeder's testimony at the rule 23B hearing: 
First, Dr. Rothfeder testified it was "possible" that the head injury was caused by a 
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fall in the bathtub. R. 530:11-12. Explaining, he said that he has seen situalions where a 
person falls "out of second story window with very little injury," and other situations 
where trauma that is "not extremely forceful" results in "severe injury." R. 530:34-35. 
Second, Dr. Rothfeder testified that it was possible that the bone fractures all 
resulted "from jumping off the couch and falling onto the brick fireplace." R. 530:12-13. 
Explaining, he said that "there is more than one impact in the course of the fall" and he 
has seen people "break their arm and their clavicle in the same incident." R. 530:24-25. 
He also testified that it was "very unlikely" that the right arm fracture was caused by 
pulling, R. 530:30-31; that surprise fractures are not necessarily indicative of abuse, R. 
530:13-14; and that it was possible Dominick did not complain about the less severe 
fractures in the right arm and collarbone because he was in so much pain from the "left 
forearm" fracture, which "was a significant fracture" with "angulation meaning the bones 
were no longer straight but at an angle." R. 530:12-14. 
Third, Dr. Rothfeder testified that whether an area of the body is "protected" for 
purposes of bruising "depend[s] upon the type of falling that's going on." R 530:22-23. 
He also said that it was "possible" that the bruising was caused by Anastasia, R. 530:15; 
that the bruise on the ear was not "likely from pinching or pulling," R. 530:20; and that 
the bruise identified as a bite mark did not appear to be a bite mark. R. 530:24. 
Finally, looking "at the totality of the circumstances," Dr. Rothfeder concluded 
that the injuries were "suspicious" of abuse but that another "possible cause" of the 
injuries was accidental falls. R. 530:32-35. In other words, the "differential diagnosis for 
[Dominick's] injuries includes child abuse and it includes accidents." R. 530:35. 
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In fact, the record shows that beyond contradicting the State's expert testimony 
and supporting Barber's defense, Dr. Rothfeder's testimony likely would have caused the 
State's experts to modify their testimony. R. 530:45-54. When the State'fs experts 
testified at trial, they excluded accidental falls as a possible cause of Dominick's injuries. 
R. 431-33. Whereas, when they were recalled after Dr. Rothfeder's testimony at the rule 
23B hearing, they each acknowledged that they could not absolutely rule out accidental 
falls as the cause of the injuries. See R. 530:45-47, 49-51, 52-54. 
In conjunction with contradicting the State's expert testimony, Dr. Rothfeder's 
testimony likely would have contradicted the State's interpretation of Exhibits 10 through 
22, 26 and 33. In section III, Barber argues these exhibits were inadmissible under rule 
403. See supra at Part III. The prejudicial effect of these exhibits was compounded by 
private counsel's failure to hire an expert to interpret the photographs. 
The State's experts used these exhibits to illustrate why they believed the bruises 
indicated abuse. R. 431:141-43, 150-59; 432:256-58, 280-81, 333. In particular, Lewis 
and Dr. Hansen used Exhibits 12 and 13 to illustrate why they believed the bruise on the 
left ear was indicative of pulling or pinching, R. 431:143; 432:257; and Exhibit 14 to 
explain why the bruise on the shoulder was likely a bite mark. R. 431:148-50; 432:258. 
If private counsel had called Dr. Rothfeder to testify, he could have used the 
exhibits to explain how the injuries could have resulted from accidental falls. See R. 
530:10-35. In forming his opinion, Dr. Rothfeder reviewed the same photographs used 
by the State's experts and came to a very different conclusion. See. R. 530:10-35. He 
believed that the injuries depicted could be explained by accidental falls. R. 530:10-35. 
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He also believed that the bruising, while extensive, was not "all over" Dominick's body 
and could have been caused by Anastasia. R. 530:15, 21. In fact, during cross-
examination, he used Exhibits 12 and 13 to explain why the bruise on Dominick's ear 
was not "likely from pinching or pulling," R. 530:20. Di. Rothfeder also could have 
diminished the inflammatory nature of the exhibits, particularly Exhibits 10, 11, 14, 19, 
and 33. As explained in section III, those exhibits were admitted to show bruises and an 
abrasion. S^e supra at Part III. In addition to those bruises, however, the photographs 
depicted Dominick's face, head, and upper body shortly after he underwent surgery. See 
supra at Part III. As he did at the rule 23B hearing, Dr. Rothfeder could have helped the 
jury distinguish between the bruises and the "large surgical wounds." R. 530:19. 
Because private counsel did not retain Dr. Rothfeder, however, the crucial points 
made by the State's experts about the cause of the injuries, including the interpretations 
of the exhibits, went unchallenged. R. 431-33. This was very damaging. If the jury 
believed the State's experts, then it had to convict because the experts excluded 
accidental falls as possible sources for the injuries. See R. 431:130-76; 432:252-84, 328-
50. And with three experts in agreement and without any expert testimony to the 
contrary, the jury had no reason to disbelieve the State's experts. R. 431-33. 
Rather than hiring an expert to counter the State's interpretation of the medical 
records, private counsel focused his investigative efforts on finding witnesses to testify 
that Barber was good with children and was telling the truth. See R. 432:369-411. As in 
Hales, however, this investigation was inadequate because character evidence was useless 
without expert testimony to counter the "crucial assertions" made by the State's experts. 
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See Hales, 2007 UT 14 at ffif76, 90-91 (reversing where defense attorneys failed to get 
expert to challenge State's expert testimony about cause of child's injuries even though 
they produced expert testimony that "the most likely cause of [child's] brain injury was 
the near-miss car accident two days prior" and "ask[ed] general questions about CT scan 
interpretation on cross-examination"). 
Indeed, the impossibility of defending Barber without expert testimony was 
evidenced by the closing arguments. In closing, the State reminded the jury that "all 
three of [the] experts opined to you, or gave you the opinion that th[ese] w[ere] abusive 
injuries." R. 433:466. It also reiterated the experts' testimony that the injuries were "not 
consistent with an accident" and "could not have happened" the way that Barber claims. 
R. 433:466-67. Referring to "the laws of physics that the experts have talked about," the 
State said during its rebuttal that it was "inconceivable" that a fall in the bathtub created 
the "substantial amount of force" necessary to cause the head injury, R. 433:481-82; and 
explained why the fractures to the right arm and collarbone could not have resulted from 
"the supposed story of [] falling on the fireplace, you absorb force and therefore, you 
decrease the likelihood that other things will be injured." R. 433:482, 483. 
Without expert testimony to the contrary, private counsel, in closing, could only 
counter the State's expert testimony with bald, unsupported assertions. For example, he 
explained the fractures by saying , "I think it's quite likely, though we don't know for 
sure, [Dominick] may have actually fractured his collar bone . . . [a]nd perhaps also the 
other arm, which wasn't so serious, the right arm" when he fell on the fireplace. R. 
433:471. And he explained the head injury by saying, "HI bet it could happen" that 
35 
Dominick fell in the bathtub and hit his "head," and "I'll bet that's what caused" the head 
injury. R. 433:477. Concluding, he argued that "it just makes sense that what caused that 
hematoma . . . was not my client, but his fall into that striation." R. 433:477. 
I lad private counsel conducted an adequate investigation (or at least adequately 
reviewed the file), he would have realized that LDA had already located an expert to 
contradict the State's expert testimony or he would have found another expert himself. 
See R. 110-25; 530:4-5, 7-8, 40-42. Under either scenario, Barber would have had expert 
testimony at trial to support his defense and to counter the State's expert testimony that 
the injuries could not be explained by accidental falls. R. 530:10-35. Had this happened, 
there is a reasonable probability that Barber could have "presented an alternative 
interpretation of the [medical records] sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to 
[Barber's] guilt." Hales, 2007 UT 14 at [^92. 
In fact, the record suggests the jury would have been swayed by expert testimony 
showing the injuries were consistent with accidental falls. Through cross-examination, 
private counsel showed that the doctors who examined Dominick after the February 28 
incident believed his injuries could be explained by a fall on the fireplace. R. 432:276-
77. Despite the State's expert testimony to the contrary, the jury acquitted Barber of this 
charge. R. 433:487. This suggests the jury was not persuaded by the State's case and 
was willing to find for Barber if there was evidence to support his defense. 
Regarding the second charge, however, the doctors who treated Dominick did not 
believe his injuries could be explained by a fall in the bathtub. R. 431-32. Thus, 
Barber's defense required expert testimony to counter the State's expert testimony that 
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the injuries were inconsistent with accidental falls. See supra at Part I.B. Private 
counsel, however, had not sought any expert advice because he wrongly believed Barber 
was not entitled to the necessary expert testimony since he could not afford to pay the 
expert fees. R. 530:4-5, 7-8; see supra at Part LA. Thus, due to inadequate preparation, 
private counsel presented no evidence to counter the State's expert testimony on count 
two and the jury was left with no choice but to convict. See supra at Part LA. Therefore, 
this Court should reverse because the "failure to investigate had a 'pervasive effect' on 
the key evidence at trial." Hales, 2007 UT 14 at ^92 (citation omitted). 
C. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Supporting Its Conclusion that Private 
Counsel Provided Effective Assistance of Counsel Were Clearly Erroneous. 
"Findings of fact. . . shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). "An appellate court must launch any review of factual 
findings from rule 52(a) . . . and its "clearly erroneous" test." In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54, 
[^29, 147 P.3d 401. The clearly erroneous standard "'requires that if the findings (or the 
trial court's verdict in a criminal case) are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if 
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made, the findings (or verdict) will be set aside.'" IdL at [^32 (citation omitted). 
"A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). The marshaled evidence as 
to the quality of private counsel's representation is as follows: 
1. In preparation for trial, private counsel talked to "a number" of witnesses 
regarding Barber's good character and love for children. R. 238-43; 530:7. He 
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also read most of the discovery. R. 530:5-6. 
2. Private counsel "did not" consult with any experts because "[tjhere were 
no funds to do so." R. 530:5, 7-8. 
3. When cross-examining Lewis and Dr. Hansen, private counsel 
established that the fractures in the right arm and collarbone could have been up to 
ten days old. R. 431:169; 432:272. 
4. When cross-examining Dr. Hansen, private counsel established that the 
bruises on the chest "looked like fingermarks," but it was "possible" that they 
were something else, R. 432:271-71; and that the bruise on Dominick's right 
shoulder was "reminiscent of a bite mark," but could have been caused by an 
object that "had an edge so that the center was nol bruised." R. 432:283. 
5. In lieu of expert testimony, private counsel called Rose Barber and seven 
other character witnesses to testify that Barber was good with children. R. 
432:369-411. Private counsel also called Tracy Jensen to testify that she 
interviewed Barber and believed he was telling the truth. R. 432:412 
6. At the rule 23B hearing, Dr. Rothfeder testified that Dominick's injuries 
were "suspicious" and "consistent with child abuse." R. 530:32-33. 
The marshaled evidence as to prejudice is as follows: 
1. Jena V testified that at the hospital on February 28, Barber c<was in and 
out of the room." R. 431:96. 
2. The day after the February 28 incident, w,Dominick didn't want [Jena V] 
to leave him in the room with just [Barber]." R. 431:61. 
3. On March 2, Ivy Owens saw Barber "hit" Dominick "across the head or 
the neck." R. 431:109, 111, 113-14, 126. Later, Barber "came up" to the cash 
register, looked "at the back of the boy's neck" and said, "What in the hell is this? 
What's going on here?" R. 431:115-16. He also "motioned to the Utile girl like 
this, shhh," and said to Owens, "'You don't think that I would' —and then 
stopped." R. 431:117. 
4. When the emergency respondcrs arrived to treat Dominick on March 2, 
Rohn Freeman thought that Barber appeared "nervous." R. 431:183. 
5. Aaron Nelson "tried to ask" Barber "several times" about the March 2 
incident, but Barber only said "that it had just happened prior to the call and that 
[Dominick] had fallen in the tub." R. 432:227-28. 233. Harmer said that Barber 
"would not directly answer the question." R. 432:219-20, 227-28. 
6. When emergency responders arrived on March 2, they found Dominick 
lying unconscious on the floor in the center of the front room. R. 431:184; R. 
432:207, 225-27. He was wearing a shirt, a diaper, and possibly pants; his clothes, 
hair, and cast were dry. R. 431:184, 190-91; 432:208, 221-22, 225-26, 233-34, 
250-51. They thought that this was "a little odd" so Harmer checked the bathtub. 
R. 432:207, 225. Harmer said that there was "about two to three inches" of 
"cool," "clear" water in the tub. R. 432:211. The "floor was dry" and there were 
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no bath toys in the tub. R. 432:214-15. 
7. When interviewed, Anastasia said that Dominick was in trouble on 
March 2 because he was "kind of not listening to my Mike." R. 432:360. 
8. Barber said that after the March 2 interview ended, "he was going . . . 
head right up" to the hospital. R. 432:314. But Barber never went to the hospital. 
R. 432:315. He was arrested "[a] little over a month" later. R. 432:315. At the 
time of his arrest, Barber had shaved his hair and grown a beard, and "[h]e was a 
lot skinnier." R. 432:317. When Officer Hauer asked him why he did not go to 
the hospital, Barber said that "he didn't want to go to jail again." R. 432:365. 
9. Lewis testified that one of the bruises "was really reminiscent of a bite 
mark," that the bruises found on the abdomen and rib cage could have been finger 
marks, R. 431:139-40, 169, 175-76; that the bruise on the left ear indicated that 
Dominick had been pinched or pulled "pretty hard," R. 431:144, 169, 175-76; that 
the bruises on the checks and right shoulder were likely not caused by falling on 
the fireplace, R. 431:174-75; that the abrasion on the back of the head came from 
one blow, R. 431:157; that the presence of fluid in one of the eyes indicated that 
Dominick was either hit in one eye or fell on it, R. 431:177; that the bruises were 
not accidental because many were in "protected spaces," R. 431:160-61; that the 
injuries was "not consistent with a single injury," R. 431:177; and that it was 
unlikely any of the bruises were caused by the emergency responders or the 
surgery. R. 431:166-67. 
10. Dr. Hansen opined that the injuries could not have been caused by a fall 
in a bathtub, R. 432:267; that she had never seen injuries like Dominick's in other 
cases where toddlers fell in bathtubs or off couches, R. 432:267; that some of the 
bruises were in "protected areas," R. 432:259; that the left arm fracture likely 
resulted "from a direct blow with bending," R. 432:260, that the lower right arm 
fracture was consistent with a twisting force like the arm being "grabbed and 
twisted," R. 432:263, that the left collarbone could have been broken by either a 
fall or a blow, R. 432:261; that it would have taken "two hands" to inflict the left 
arm fracture, that the person that caused the left arm fracture "would have to be 
trying to" inflict injury, R. 432:276; that it would likely have taken two blows or 
falls to break both the collarbone and arm, R. 432:261; and that "[sjurprise 
fractures are always concerning for an inflicted and abusive cause." R. 432:266. 
11. Dr. Walker testified that the head injury required a "violent blow to the 
head," R. 432:331, 339; that a "fall in the tub" could not "generate" the "energy 
necessary" to cause the head injury, R. 432:339-40; that the force necessary to 
create the head injury would have required "a high speed automobile accident" or 
vwa fall from a second or third-floor window," R. 432:341, 344; that the head injury 
was consistent with "being struck violently in the back of the head" with 
"something, like a baseball bat or some hard object," R. 432:341, 343-44; that the 
head injury was inflicted, R. 432:351; that a neck or other injury would not 
accompany the head trauma if someone struck Dominick in the back of the head, 
R. 432:344; that Dominick would have been unconscious "immediately or very, 
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very quickly" after the injury, R. 432:345; that the injuries "will surely lead to 
some learning problems" for Dominick, R. 432:346; and that bruises on the chest 
and back arc "very rare for a child to obtain . . . from normal falls." R. 432:332. 
First, the trial court's findings of fact regarding the effectiveness of private 
counsel's representation are "'against the clear weight of the evidence.'" Z.D., 2006 UT 
54 at [^32 (citation omitted). The trial court found that private counsel "did a thorough 
and competent job representing the defendant at trial." R. 526. This is actually a 
conclusion of law. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) (explaining that 
legal determinations are "those which are not of fact but are essentially of rules or 
principles uniformly applied to persons of similar qualities and status in similar 
circumstances" (citation omitted)). Rule 23B does not grant the trial court authority to 
make conclusions of law. See Utah R. App. P. 23B(e). Even if it did, the trial court's 
conclusions should be reviewed for correctness, meaning this Court will "decide[] the 
matter for itself and will "not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of 
law." Pena, 869 P.2d at 936 (citations omitted). Therefore, for the reasons presented in 
section I.A., this Court should hold that the trial court erred by concluding that private 
counsel provided "thorough and competent" representation. R. 526. 
In particular, the trial court found that private counsel "did a thorough and 
competent job" when he "called eight character witnesses to testify as to defendant's 
character around children" in lieu of calling an expert to interpret the medical records. R. 
526. To the extent that this is a factual finding rather than a legal conclusion, it is clearly 
erroneous. As explained in section I.B., evidence bolstering Barber's character was 
useless without expert testimony to counter the "crucial assertions" made by the State's 
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experts that the accidental falls claimed by Barber could not explain Dominick's injuries. 
Hales, 2007 UT 14 at 1ff|76, 90-91; see supra at Part LB. Private counsel recognized the 
need for expert testimony, but "did not" hire an expert because he believed that "[t]here 
were no funds to do so." R. 530:5. This decision was unreasonable because Utah law 
guarantees "public assistance for expert witnesses" for any defendant whq can establish 
"proof of necessity" and "indigence." Burns, 2000 UT 56 at ^32; see supra at Part LA. 
The trial court also found that private counsel "[thoroughly covered the issue of 
whether the boy's injuries might have been caused by accidental falls on both direct and 
cross-examination" and "questioned the experts on cross-examination about the 
possibility that the injuries may have resulted from accidental falls and rough play and 
biting by the child's sister." R. 526. By so doing, he "elicited sufficient doubt in the 
minds of the jury to conclude the defendant was not guilty o f count one and "showed 
that he had fulfilled his duty to make reasonable investigations into the possibility that the 
child's injuries were sustained from some other source than battery." R. 526. 
To the extent that these are factual findings rather than legal concisions, they are 
clearly erroneous. Private counsel did not question any witnesses on direct examination 
about the cause of Dominick's injuries. See R. 432:369-422. Further, although private 
counsel cross-examined the State's expert witnesses, he did not establish |that the injuries 
may have resulted from accidental falls, rough play, or biting by Dominick's sister. R. 
431-32. To the contrary, his only success on cross-examination was to establish that the 
fractures in the right arm and collarbone could have been up to ten days old, R. 431:169, 
272; that it was "possible," but unlikely, that the bruises on the chest were not 
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fingermarks, R. 432:270-71; and that it was possible, but unlikely, that the bruise on the 
right shoulder was not "a bite mark," but caused by an object that "had an edge so that 
the center was not bruised." R. 432:283. As in Hales, these minor successes did not 
discredit the State's expert opinions or validate Barber's defense. See Hales, 2007 UT 14 
at l||92. Rather, testimony from Dr. Rothfeder or another expert was necessary to support 
Barber's defense that the injuries resulted from accidental falls. See id. 
True, private counsel was able to create sufficient doubt regarding the February 28 
incident to obtain a not guilty verdict in count one. See R. 526. But, as explained in 
section LB, the doctors who examined Dominick after the February 28 incident believed 
his injuries could be explained by a fall on the fireplace. R. 432:276-77. Thus, private 
counsel was able to elicit the expert opinion necessary to support Barber's defense 
through cross-examination. R. 432:276-77. Because there was no similar evidence 
regarding the March 2 incident, presentation of Barber's defense to count two required a 
defense expert to contradict the State's expert testimony. See supra at Part I B. 
Second, regarding the trial court's findings of fact about the prejudicial effect of 
private counsel's representation, this Court should conclude "a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made.'" Z.D., 2006 UT 54 at ^32 (citation omitted). 
The trial court found that the State "presented evidence demonstrating defendant's course 
of conduct amounted to battery" and presented "expert testimony" regarding the cause of 
the injuries that "was overwhelming, consistent and not equivocal." R. 525-26. These 
findings, however, are the very reason that private counsel's failure to hire an expert was 
so prejudicial. As explained in section LB, the State relied on expert testimony to show 
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that the injuries were not caused by accidental falls. See supra at Part LB. Thus, private 
counsel's failure to hire an expert that would counter the State's "overwhelming, 
consistent and not equivocal" expert testimony, R. 525-26, requires reversal because it 
"had a 'pervasive effect' on the key evidence at trial." Hales, 2007 UT 14 at [^92. 
The trial court also made several conclusions of law. As explained above, rule 
23B does not grant the trial court authority to make conclusions of law. See Utah R. 
App. P. 23B(c). Even if it did, conclusions are reviewed for correctness. Pena, 869 P.2d 
at 936 (citations omitted). Therefore, for the reasons presented in section LA. and LB., 
this Court should hold that the trial court erred by concluding that private counsel did not 
provide ineffective assistance of counsel. R. 527-28. 
One of the trial court's conclusions—that "Dr. Rothfeder's evidence was not as 
credible as the State's evidence" and "would have made no difference" at trial—is 
arguably a finding. R. 527-28. To the extent that it is, it is clearly erroneous because, as 
explained in Hales, reversal for ineffective assistance does not require a reviewing court 
to "find that the jury would have more likely than not believed another expert's 
interpretation over" the State's expert testimony. Hales, 2007 UT 14 at [^92. To the 
contrary, a reviewing court will reverse where, as here, the "failure to investigate had a 
'pervasive effect' on the key evidence at trial." Id.; see supra at Part LB. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING 
PRIVATE COUNSEL'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL 
AND/OR MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE 
"'[T]he granting of a continuance is discretionary.'" Cabututan, 861 P.2d at 413 
(citation omitted). Likewise, the granting of a motion to withdraw as counsel is 
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discretionary. See Pursifelf 746 P.2d at 273. A trial court abuses its discretion if 
denying the motion "result[s] in the violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel." Cabututan, 861 P.2d at 413. Applying the Strickland test, this Court should 
reverse because the trial court's decision to deny the motion to withdraw as counsel 
and/or for a continuance rendered private counsel ineffective. Sec supra at Part I. 
Private counsel moved to withdraw and/or to continue the trial because: (1) Barber 
was not able to pay his legal fees and wanted to return to LDA for representation, and (2) 
he had not been able to adequately prepare for trial because he had been ill. R. 150-51; 
430:16. Both of these grounds warranted a withdrawal of counsel and/or a continuance. 
First, the trial court abused its discretion by denying a withdrawal of counsel 
where Barber no longer wanted his privately-retained counsel of choice and wanted to 
return to LDA for representation. R. 150-51; 430:16. "In cases where a defendant has 
retained his own counsel, 'an element of [his right to counsel] is the right of a defendant 
... to choose who will represent him.'" State v. Gall 2007 UT App 85,1J12, 158 P.3d 
1105 (citation omitted). "'Where the right to be assisted by counsel of one's choice is 
wrongly denied, . . . it is unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or prejudice inquiry to 
establish a Sixth Amendment violation.'" Id. (citation omitted). '"Deprivation of the 
right is complete when the defendant is erroneously prevented from being represented by 
the lawyer he wants[.]'" Id. (citation omitted). Further, as explained in section I, 
denying Barber the opportunity to return to LDA resulted in a violation of his right to 
effective counsel. See Cabututan, 861 P.2d at 413. If Barber had been represented by 
LDA, then he would have had the expert testimony that he needed to presenl his defense. 
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See supra at Part I; R. 110; 530:39-41. Because the trial court denied private counsel's 
motion to withdraw, however, Barber's case was prejudiced because private counsel 
failed to adequately investigate or to hire the needed expert testimony. See id. 
Second, the trial court abused its discretion by denying a withdrawal of counsel 
and/or a continuance where private counsel acknowledged that he was unprepared for 
trial. Barber was facing serious felony charges. R. 1-4; 290A-C. Private counsel 
acknowledged that he did not practice criminal law regularly and that he had been too ill 
to adequately prepare for trial. R. 150-51; 430:16; 530:2. Indeed, the recqrd shows that 
he failed to review the file well enough to realize that a defense expert had already been 
consulted. R. 530:4-5. He failed to review the rules sufficiently to realize that Barber 
could receive funding to hire an expert. R. 530:5, 8; see supra at Part I. And he failed to 
read "a large stack" of medical files, even though he lcnew that the medical records were 
critical to the State's case and to Barber's defense. R. 530:5-6, 8; see supra at Part I. 
Prior to trial, the trial court knew that private counsel was in poor health and was 
unprepared for trial. R. 150-51; 430:16. On top of all this, it had known private counsel 
"for some 30 years" and had low expectations for his performance at trial feven if he was 
prepared and in good health. R. 530:65. Further, as demonstrated in section I, private 
counsefs unfamiliarity with criminal law, poor health, and lack of preparation ultimately 
resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel that prejudiced Barber's case. See supra at 
Part I. Accordingly, this Court should reverse because the trial court's decision to deny 
the motion to withdraw as counsel and/or for a continuance resulted in a violation of 
Barber's right to counsel. See Montoya, 2004 UT 5 at ^|23; Cabututan, 86l P.2d at 413. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICED BARBER BY ADMITTING 
PHOTOGRAPHS IN VIOLATION OF RULE 403 
When deciding whether to admit photographs, "a court should undertake a three-
step analysis." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 87, f35, 57 P.3d 220. 
First, we look to whether the photograph is relevant. Second, we consider 
whether the photograph is gruesome. Finally, we apply the appropriate 
balancing test. If the photograph is gruesome, it should not be admitted 
unless the State can show that the probative value of the photograph 
outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice. If the photograph is not gruesome, it 
should be admitted unless the defendant can show that the risk of unfair 
prejudice outweighs the probative value of the photograph. 
Id (quoting Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at TJ46). 
In this case, this Court should reverse because the risk of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighed the probative value of Exhibits 10 through 22, 26 and 33. 
"|E|vidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice." Utah R. Evid. 403. Photographs of the victim's injuries 
have "limited probative value" if they serve only to corroborate "uncontested facts" or 
the credibility of a witness whose testimony is not "of great importance in the case and 
hotly contested by the parties." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 87,TJ40, 57 P.3d 220. 
On the other hand, they can be extremely prejudicial. When determining the 
danger of unfair prejudice, courts may consider "whether the photograph is in color or 
black and white, because color photographs are generally more disturbing because of 
their ability to provide the viewer with vivid images of blood, wounds, bruising, and the 
like"; "whether the photograph is an enlargement or close-up shot, again, because 
enlarged photographs and close-ups show greater detail"; "when the photograph was 
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taken in relation to the crime and whether it depicts the victim as found at jthe crime 
scene" because crime scene photographs may "show unnatural body contortions"; 
"whether other details in a photograph, aside from the victim, may render a photograph 
gruesome |because] the composition in the photograph may exacerbate the photograph's 
impact on the viewer"; and "any characteristics of the photograph that tend to make it 
more or less inflammatory." Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at ffif43 & n.7, 50, 53 n.10 (noting factors 
for determining gruesomeness can be used for rule 403 balancing test). 
For example, in State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512 (Utah 1968), the trial court abused its 
discretion by admitting slides of the victim's dissected brain cavity because there was no 
question the victim died of bullet wounds to the head and the "only purpose served was to 
inflame and arouse the jury." Poe, 441 P.2d at 515. Although "[i]t could yery well be 
that the jury would have returned the same verdict absent its view of the slides," our 
supreme court reversed because the slides may "have tipped the scales in favor of the 
death penalty." IcL Similarly, in State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979), our supreme 
court held the trial court erred by admitting three close-up photographs of the bullet 
wound—one with the shirt on, one with the shirt removed and dried blood, and one with 
the shirt removed and no blood. Wells, 603 P.2d at 812-13. The photographs had no 
"evidentiary value" because defendant "did not dispute shooting" the victim. Id. at 813. 
Thus, the only purpose in admitting the photographs was the "hoped-for emotional 
impact on the jury." Id Regardless, our supreme court affirmed because a '"review of 
the entire record'" showed that the error was harmless. Id. (citation omitted). 
Conversely, in Bluff, our supreme court determined that the probative value of 
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admitting autopsy photographs was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. In that case, defendant was charged with murder and child abuse. At trial, she 
claimed that the child fell down the stairs and that she did not know the extent of the 
injuries. Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at ^fl 1-12. The photographs were in color, enlarged, and 
close-up, but they presented little danger of unfair prejudice because they depicted 
"cleaned wounds and little, if any, blood" and they did not "distort the 'thing 
photographed.'" Id, at ^49-50. Moreover, they were "highly probative of the State's 
contention that [defendant] knew about [the child's] injuries and that the injuries did not 
result from an accidental fall down the stairs." Id. at TJ53. Thus, the "probative value of 
the photographs substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect." I<±; see also Calliham, 
2002 UT 87 at ]^40 (holding photographs were admissible, even though they "posed a risk 
of unfairly prejudicing the jury," because they corroborated "credibility o f witness 
whose testimony "was of great importance" and "hotly contested by the parties"). 
In this case, State's Exhibits 10 through 22, 26 and 33 had limited probative value. 
The State admitted these exhibits to show the bruising on Dominick's body. In 
particular, the State admitted Exhibits 10 and 11 to show small bruises on the forehead 
and cheeks; Exhibits 12 and 13 to show a bruise on the left car; Exhibits 14 and 17 to 
show a supposed bite mark on the right shoulder; Exhibits 15 and 16 to show bruises on 
the left shoulder; Exhibit 18 to show a bruise near the groin; Exhibits 19, 20. and 26 to 
show bruises on the back; Exhibit 21 to show a bruise on the abdomen; Exhibit 22 to 
show a bruise on the knee; and Exhibit 33 to show an abrasion on the back of the head. 
Barber did not dispute that Dominick had bruising or the extent of the bruising. 
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R. 431-33. Nor was bruising an element of the offenses charged. See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-109 (requiring State to prove serious bodily injury, which does not include 
bruising). Moreover, the State used expert testimony, not photographs, to prove serious 
bodily injury. See R. 431-33. Therefore, at most, evidence of bruising helped the State 
show that Dominick's injuries were wide-spread, thereby increasing the likelihood that he 
was abused. See Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at ^53. Photographs of the bruises were not 
necessary to accomplish this purpose, however, because the State's experts described the 
bruises, used diagrams to identify the size, shape, and location of the bruises, and 
hypothesized about the cause of the bruises. R. 431-33; Exhibits 30, 31. 
On the other hand, the exhibits created a great danger of unfair prejudice. The 
exhibits are enlarged 8x10 inch color photographs that show close-up shots of an 
unconscious two-year-old child shortly after major surgery. Almost all show tubes, 
wires, and other apparatuses surrounding and attached to his body. R. Exhibits 12-13, 
15-22, 26. And many are repetitive. For example, Exhibits 10 and 11 show the same 
bruises on the face; Exhibits 12 and 13 both show the left ear; Exhibits 14 and 17 both 
show a supposed bite mark on the right shoulder; Exhibits 15 and 16 both show the left 
shoulder; Exhibits 19, 20, and 26 all show the back, and Exhibit 33 shows an abrasion on 
the back of the head that was shown less prejudicially in another exhibit admitted without 
objection, State's Exhibit 24. See R. 432:279-80. Individually and collectively, the main 
purpose these exhibits served was to "inflame and arouse the jury" by overwhelming 
them with graphic photographs of the injured child. Poe, 441 P.2d at 515. 
Exhibits 10, 11, 14, 19, and 33, in particular, are especially prejudicial. They are 
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enlarged 8x10 inch photographs that show close-up shots of Dominick's face, head, and 
upper body shortly after he underwent surgery. Exhibits 10, 11, 14, 19, 33. They are in 
color and provide "vivid images of blood, wounds, [and] bruising." See Bluff, 2002 UT 
66 at 1J43. They show Dominick with a shaved head and a long incision circling across 
the top of his head to the back of his head and back around to his ear. See Exhibits 10, 
11, 19, 33. The incision is fresh and is held together with staples. See Exhibits 10, 11, 
19, 33. There is wet and dry blood splattered over the top of his head and on his bed 
sheets. See Exhibits 14, 19, 33. His ear is bloody. See Exhibit 14. He is wearing a 
collar to keep his head in place and the collar is a blood-stained. See Exhibits 10, 11, 14, 
19, 33. There is an apparatus sticking into the top of his head. See Exhibits 10, 11. 
There are tubes in his mouth held in place with tape that disfigures his lips and there are 
many tubes and wires connected to his body. See Exhibits 10, 11, 14, 33. 
Weighed together, the limited probative value of the photographs was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Thus, this Court should 
reverse because the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the exhibits. 
CONCLUSION 
Barber respectfully asks this Court to reverse his convictions. 
SUBMITTED this £* day of June, 2008. 
LORIJTSEPPI 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Based on the defendant's conviction of CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT a 2nd 
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U.S. Const, amend VI 
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 (2003) 
76-5-109 Child abuse. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Child" means a human being who is under 18 years of age. 
(b) "Child abuse" means any offense described in Subsection (2) or (3), or in 
Section 76-5-109.1. 
(c) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of a child which impairs the 
physical condition of the child, including: 
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin; 
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion; 
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or 
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's health or welfare and 
which is not a serious physical injury as defined in Subsection (l)(d). 
(d) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury or set of injuries which 
seriously impairs the child's health, or which involves physical torture or causes serious 
emotional harm to the child, or which involves a substanlial risk of death to Ihe child, 
including: 
(i) fracture of any bone or bones; 
(ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of the brain, whether caused 
by blows, shaking, or causing the child's head to impact with an object or surface; 
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot water, or those caused by 
placing a hot object upon the skin or body of the child; 
(iv) any injury caused by use of a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(v) any combination of two or more physical injuries inflicted by the same 
person, either at the same time or on different occasions; 
(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body; 
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in severe emotional harm, 
severe developmental delay or retardation, or severe impairment of the child's 
ability to function; 
(viii) any injury which creates a permanent disfigurement or protracted loss 
or impairment of the function of a bodily member, limb, or organ; 
(ix) any conduct which causes a child to cease breathing, even if 
resuscitation is successful following the conduct; or 
(x) any conduct which results in starvation or failure to thrive or 
malnutrition that jeopardizes the child's life. 
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or, having the care or 
custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict serious physical injury upon a 
child is guilty of an offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a felony of the second degree; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third degree; or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, having the care or custody of 
such child, causes or permits another to inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of an 
offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a class A misdemeanor; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor; or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class C misdemeanor. 
(4) A parent or legal guardian who provides a child with treatment by spiritual means 
alone through prayer, in lieu of medical treatment, in accordance with the tenets and 
practices of an established church or religious denomination of which the parent or legal 
guardian is a member or adherent shall not, for that reason alone, be deemed to have 
committed an offense under this section. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-109, enacted by L. 1981, ch. 64, § 1; 1992, ch. 192, § 1; 1997, ch. 
289, § 5; 1997, ch. 303, § 2; 1998, ch. 81, § 1; 1999, ch. 67, § 1; 2000, ch. 125, § 1. 
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the 
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and 
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for 
purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a 
master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the 
court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally 
and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or 
memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court 
shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all 
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based 
on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of 
judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend 
the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial 
pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without 
a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may 
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made in the district 
court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion 
for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(c)(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(c)(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(c)(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
Utah R. App. P. 23B 
Rule 23B. Motion to remand for findings necessary to determination of ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. 
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case may move the court 
to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, necessary for the 
appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion 
shall be available only upon a nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in 
the record on appeal, which, if true, could support a determination that counsel was 
ineffective. 
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief. Upon a showing of 
good cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after the filing of the appellant's 
brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to be filed after oral argument. Nothing 
in this rule shall prohibit the court from remanding the case under this rule on its own 
motion at any time if the claim has been raised and the motion would have been available 
to a party. 
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion shall conform to the 
requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be accompanied by affidavits 
alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal that show the claimed deficient 
performance of the attorney. The affidavits shall also allege facts that show the claimed 
prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. The 
motion shall also be accompanied by a proposed order or remand that identifies the 
ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such claim to be 
addressed on remand. 
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the motion is filed. The response shall 
include a proposed order of remand that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies 
the factual issues relevant to each such claim to be addressed by the trial court in the 
event remand is granted, unless the responding party accepts that proposed by the moving 
party. Any reply shall be filed within 10 days after the response is filed. 
(c) Order of the court. If the requirements of parts (a) and (b) of this rule have been met, 
the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to the trial court for the 
purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. The order of remand shall identify the ineffectiveness claims and specify the 
factual issues relevant to each such claim to be addressed by the trial court. The order 
shall also direct the trial court to complete the proceedings on remand within 90 days of 
issuance of the order of remand, absent a finding by the trial court of good cause for a 
delay of reasonable length. 
If it appears to the appellate court that the appellant's attorney of record on the appeal 
faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the court shall direct that counsel withdraw and 
that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or retained. 
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be vacated upon the 
filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other procedural steps required by these 
rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand, unless a stay is ordered by the court 
upon stipulation or motion of the parties or upon the court's motion. 
(e) Proceedings before the trial court. Upon remand the trial court shall promptly conduct 
hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the findings of fact necessary to 
determine the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel Any claims of ineffectiveness 
not identified in the order of remand shall not be considered by the trial court on remand, 
unless the trial court determines that the interests of justice or judicial efficiency require 
consideration of issues not specifically identified in the order of remand. Evidentiary 
hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as practicable after remand. The 
burden of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the fact. The standard of proof 
shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court shall enter written findings of 
fact concerning the claimed deficient performance by counsel and the claimed prejudice 
suffered by appellant as a result, in accordance with the order of remand. Proceedings on 
remand shall be completed within 90 days of entry of the order of remand, unless the trial 
court finds good cause for a delay of reasonable length. 
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all proceedings before 
the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court reporter shall immediately prepare 
the record of the supplemental proceedings as required by these rules. If the record of the 
original proceedings before the trial court has been transmitted to the appellate court, the 
clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit the record of the supplemental 
proceedings upon preparation of the supplemental record. If the record of the original 
proceedings before the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk 
of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon the 
preparation of the entire record. 
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from the trial court, the 
clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule for briefing or oral argument 
under these rules. Errors claimed to have been made during the trial court proceedings 
conducted pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the same standards as the review of 
errors in other appeals. The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable 
under the same standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals. 
2 
Utah R. Evid. 403 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of 
time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to Rule 45, Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971) except that "surprise" is not included as a basis for exclusion of 
relevant evidence. The change in language is not one of substance, since "surprise" would 
be within the concept of "unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 403. See also Advisory 
Committee Note to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a continuance in most instances 
would be a more appropriate method of dealing with "surprise." See also Smith v. Estelle, 
445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric testimony in capital case 
ruled prejudicial and violation of due process). See the following Utah cases to the same 
effect. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); State v. Johns, 
615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982). 
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MONTE SLEIGHT (8510) 
HEATHER BRERETON (8151) , -- r T"] 
Attorneys for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South " \ f Y \ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, NOTICE OF EXPERT WITNESS 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
: Case No. 051901413 FS 
MICHAEL C. BARBER, 
: JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENROID 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Michael Barber, by and through his attorneys of record, 
Monte Sleight and Heather Brereton, and hereby provides notice pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§77-17-13, of their intention to cal Dr. Robert K. Rothfeder, M.D. as an expert witness to testify 
at the jury trial in the above-entitled case as to the alleged victim's injuries. Dr. Rothfeder's 
Curriculum Vitae is attached and a report is forthcoming. 
Respectfully submitted this ? f day of January, 2006. 
HeatherBrereton 
Attorney for Defendant 
1 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered an original of the foregoing to 
the office of the Salt Lake County District Attorney, 111 East Broadway, Suite 400, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 this ^ L 'day of January, 2006. 
Q£ 
2 
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CURRICULUM VITAE 
ROBERT K. ROTHFEDER, MLD. 
Professional Address : 175 West 200 South 
Suite 4009 
Salt Lake City7 Utah 84101 
(801)359-7756 
Education : Rutgers University 
New Brunswick, New Jersey 
B.A.1969 
University of Minnesota Medical School 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 
M.D. 1974 
Internship and Resideticy - Internal Medicine 
LDS Hospital 
Salt Lake City. Utah 1974-1977 
University of Utah College of Law 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
J.D. 1984 
Board Certification : American Board of Emergency Medicine 
Board Qualified ; Internal Medicine 
Private practice : Lakeview Hospital Emergency Department 
Bountiful, Utah 
Emergency Department Director, Emergency Physician 
19774994 
St, Mark's Hospital Emergency Department 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Emergency Physician 1994 - present 
WL 
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ROBERT K ROTHFEDER, MLD. CURRICULUM VITAE PAGE 2 
Private practice in association with 
Dennis J Wyman, M.D, 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4009 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
1991 -present 
Referral practice specializing in the 
evaluation and rehabilitation of motor vehicle related 
trauma, 
Of Counsel 
Winder & Haslam 
Attorneys at Law 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
1985 -present 
ROBERT K, ROTHFEDER, M.D, 
175 WEST 200 SOUTH # 4009 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TEL: 801-359-7756 
FAX: 801-532-3706 
Cases in which! have testijfied as an expert witness at trial or by deposition prior to the present 
case are as follows: 
Darger v, Baxter 
Utah 3rd District Court 
ArchJcta v. Rigby 
Utah 3rd District Court (Arbitration) 
State of Utah v. Geoffrey L. Clark 
Utah 2nd District Court, Weber County 
Michael Ba.bb v. Yellow Cab Co, 
Utah 3rd District Court 
Jane Chase v. Dr. Michael Stultz et al 
Utah 3rd District Court 
Karcy Herring v, Electrical WliolesaJc Supply Inc, et al 
Utah 4th District Court 
Wendy Pay Y. Viking Insurance 
Utah 3rd District Court 
Kacy ClufFand Liliana Guff v. State Farm Insurance 
Utah 2nd District Court 
Debora Plummer v. Russ Carrigan Motors, Inc. 
Utah 2nd District Court 
Silinsky v, Vercnax 
Utah 3rd District Court 
Angle McMorris v. Evans and Robinson 
Utah 3rd District Court 
Bonnie Myers v, Golimore 
Utah 3rd District Court 
Pmcojmbe v. Reynolds 
Utah 2nd District Court 
08/18/2085 17:31 2558985 ROTHFEDER PAGE 05 
Reeves v. Uvalko R.K.Rothfeder, M.D. 
Utah 3rd District Court Expert Witness 
Case List; 
Sant v. George et al Page 2 
Utah 3rd District Court 
State of Utah v. Sally Micheisen 
Utah 3rd District Court 
Fujimoto v. Unum et al 
Utah 2nd District Court 
Quigley v. Morris 
Utah 3rd District Court 
State v. Jimenez 
Utah 3rd District Court 
State v, Ahlstrom 
Utah 3rd District Court 
Lisa Grace v. Smith 
Utah 3rd District Court (arbitration) 
Norman Barker v, Prescott 
Utah 3rd District Court (arbitration ) 
State v. Shirley Wells 
Utah 3rd District Court 
State v. Sean Darger 
Utah 3rd District Court 
Michelle Ehle v, Dr. David Carlquist 
Utah 2nd District Court 
John Durham v. Duschene County 
Utah 4th District Court 
Britney Cleave v. Cody Medical Center 
Wyoming District Court 
Estate of Robert Dawson v Billings Deaconess Medical Center et al 
US District Court for Montana 
Adams v, Food Management Corp. and Sysco 
Utah 3rd District Court 
08/18/2005 17:31 2558986 ROTHFEDER PAGE 0b 
Bonnie Myers v.Gallimorc R.K. Rothfeder, M.D. 
Utah 3rd District Court Expert Witness 
Case List 
USA v. Darell Dee Page 3 
US District Court for Utah 
State v. Henry Randolph 
Utah 3rd District Court 
USA v.Cody Cbico Harney 
US District Court for Reno, Nevada 
Brack v, Sanpete Valley Hospital 
Utah 4th District Court 
Polepoi v. Hoyt 
Utah 3rd District Court 
USA v, Clark Jones 
US District Court for Utah 
USA v. Bobby Redcap 
US District Court for Utah 
State of Utah v. Lance Jagger et al 
Utah 6th District Court 
USA v. Benaly 
US District Court for Utah 
Azcuenaga v, Suzuki 
US District Court for Utah 
State v. Brent Robert Shaw 
Utah 3rd District Court 
State v. Bradley Knight 
Utah 3rd District Court 
Eleanor Smith v. Monument Valley Hospital 
Utah 6th District Court 
Myers v. Stanley Door Co. 
Utah 3rd District Court 
USAv. Cantrell 
US District Court for Reno, Nevada 
08/18/2005 17:31 2558986 ROTHFEDER PAGE 07 
James Chesney v. DJ 's Club R. K. Rothfeder, M.D. 
Utah 3rd District Court Expert Witness 
Case List 
State v. Myers Page 4 
Idaho 4th District Court, Elmore County 
Christopher Johnson v. Kilgrow 
Utah 3rd District Court 
State v. Swimmer 
Utah 3rd District Court 
USA v. Jerry Lee Morgan 
US District Court, Reno, Nevada 
State v. Kevin Baxter 
Utah 3rd District Court 
State v. Daniels 
Utah 6th District Court, Sanpete County 
State v. Steven Ray Allen 
Utah District Court for Grand County 
USA v. Adam Swapp> Singer et al 
US District Court for Utah 
State v. Swapp. Singer et al 
Utah District Court for Summit County 
State v, Nelson 
Utah 2nd District Court, Ogdeu 
Sharafsaleh v. Arthur and Jessica Reilly 
Utah 3rd District 
State v. Shapiro 
Utah 3rd District 
Michael D, Henderson v, Estate of Leon Mitchell et al 
Utah 3rd District 
State v, Lanee Munoz 
Utah 3rd District 
Jerry Romero v. Southern New Mexico Correctional Facility 
New Mexico Federal District Court 
88/18/2005 17:31 2558986 ROTHFEDER 
State v. Robert Allen Weitzel 
Utah 2nd District 
State Y. Oelseth 
Utah 3rd District 
Lyngel v. High Challenge 
Utah 4th District 
Crystal Darling v. Teerlink 
Utah 3rd District 
Brack v. Fitzgerald, Olsen, & Sanpete Valley Hospital 
Utah 4th District 
Fransisco Magana v. Moroni Feed Co. 
Utah Labor Commission 
State v, Diviney 
Utah 3rd District 
Winton Aposhian y. Lafchwinder Singh and Vi& Cab 
Utah 3rd District 
Hamid Bashir v. Matt P. Masock 
Utah 3rd District 
Geraldine Susaeta y. .Karolyn K. Burrows 
Utah 3rd District 
Joseph B, Nelson v. Andrea P. Jones 
Utah 2nd District 
State Y. Kenneth Campos 
Utah 2nd District 
State v, Lester Gonzales 
Utah 1st District 
Scott Myers v, Orion Insurance 
Utah 3rd District (Arbitration) 
State y. Shayne Todd 
Utah 3rd District 
State v. Blake Bleazard 
Utah 3rd District 
68/18/2005 17:31 2558986 ROTHFEDER PAGE 09 
Linda Turner v. Donna Cussimanio et al R.IC Rothfeder, M.D, 
Utah 3rd District Expert Witness 
Case List 
State of Virginia v. D. Wildes Page 6 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
Karen Close and Julie Gamble v. Valerie Ann Skinner et al 
Utah 3rd District 
State v. Glenna Talbot 
Utah 3rd District 
State v. Sean Grills 
Utah 3rd District 
Shelly Pierce v. Ricky Charley 
Utah 3rd District 
State v. Corey Maisey 
Utah 2nd District 
Justin Perez v. Brent Bytendorp 
Utah 3rd District 
Walt Wagoner v. U & I Consumer's Co-op 
Utah 2nd District 
State of Utah, in the interest of Dakota Anderson 
Utah 3rd District Juvenile Court 
Theresa Viramontes v. Allstate Insurance 
In the matter of the Arbitration between 
State of Utah in the interest of Kylie Wright 
Utah 3rd District Juvenile Court 
State v, Frank Dominguez 
Utah 2nd District 
Maloney v. Caniere 
Utah 3rd District 
David Purdy v. Greg Naccarata 
Utah 3rd District 
State v. Felix Blanco 
Utah 3rd District 
R. K. Rothfeder, M.D. 
Expert Witness 
Case List 
Page 7 
Youngblood v. Cooksey 
Utah 3rd District 
USA v. Robert Allan Weitzel 
U. S. District Court for Utah 
April Coyne v. Tebbs et al 
U. S. District Court for Utah 
Cindy Comeau v. Richard Hoagland 
Utah 3rd District (Murray) 
State v. Jeri Daines 
Utah 2nd District 
Renee Roberts v. Jocef Jakubik 
Utah 3rd District 
Jill Robinson v. Landcar Life Insurance 
AAA Arbitration 
Mahe & Ezette Fifeta v. Howard Steven Reams 
Utah 3rd District 
Glen Putnam v. Dick Simon Trucking 
Utah 3rd District ( Sandy) 
Mark and Cindi Hunter v. Daniel Baker et al 
Utah 3rd District 
Sharon Preslar v. LDS Hospital et al 
Utah 3rd District 
State of Utah v. Guiarte 
Utah 1st District 
Heather Van Cooney y. Heidi Peterson 
Utah 3rd District Arbitration 
Tammy Cantonwine v. Jeff Zdunich 
Utah 3rd District 
Ruano v, Leeds 
Utah 3rd District 
Estate of Connie Nielsen v. Norwegian Cruise Line 
Miami, Florida 
R, K, Rothfeder, M.D. 
Expert Witness 
Case List 
Page 8 
State v. Steven Johnson 
Utah 2nd District 
Bonnie Myers v. Progressive Insurance 
Utah 3rd District 
State v. Shawn Gressman 
Utah 3rd District 
Palfreyman v. Schmidt 
Utah 3rd District 
Leslie Perkins v. Jason Williams 
Utah 2nd District 
State v, Robert Allen Weitzel (retrial) 
Utah 2nd District 
State v. Michelle Michaels 
Utah 3rd District 
Mark Marabello v. Ritsu Hayashi 
Utah 3rd District 
Kevin UUand v. Pioneer USA 
Labor Commission of Utah 
Conrad B> Houser and Gloria P, Houser v. John A, Brovvning 
Utah 2nd District 
Judy Mayfield v. Bob Wilkinson and Jennifer Croft 
Utah 3rd District 
Bertha LePlat & Mauricio Guzman v. Lewis Bros. Stages Inc. et al 
Utah 3rd District 
State of Utah v. Scott Allen Aseltine 
Utah 3rd District 
Jeremy Bruderer et al v. Dale T. Smith & Sons Meat Packing Plant 
Utah 3rd District 
State v. Ryan Wnght 
Utah 3rd District 
State v. Trent Tucker 
Utah 3rd District 
Frances Dickerman, Katherine Herbst et al v. Currier R, K. Rotbfeder, M,D 
State of Connecticut Superior Court Expert Witness 
Judicial District of New London Case List 
Page 9 
Meadors, et al v. AAA Carriage Company, Inc. 
Utah 3rd District 
Halpin v.Hall 
Utah 3rd District 
Marilyn Warren v. McCurdy 
Utah 3rd District 
Melinda Taylor v. Ashlee & Russell Baird 
Utah 2nd District 
Alexis Campbell v. Allstate 
Arbitration 
Kenneth M. Ferree v. David M. Morris 
Utah 2nd District 
Tammie Paifreyman v, Steven K. Workman, Jr, 
Utah 3rd District 
Alicia Caraballo v. Stringfeilow 
Utah 3rf District 
State v, Raynette Olsen 
Utah 2ad District 
Division of Child and Family Services v, Roger Marcy 
Utah Department of Human Services Administrative Proceeding 
Nahid Kermani v. Smith 
Utah 3rd District 
David Marabello v. Ritsu Hayashi 
Utah 3rd District 
Kathryn Barney v. Dixon 
Utah2od District 
Star Marie Anderson v. Tanya Wallace 
Utah 3rd District 
In the Matter of the Estate of Xiu Ling Yu 
Utah 3* District (Probate) 
In the Matter of the Estate of Xiu Ling Yu 
Utah 3rd District (Probate) 
State v Bellarion Ancira 
District Court of Weber County 
U.S A v. Vaun Perman 
U.S. District Court, District of Utah, Central Division 
James Gum v. Crowley 
Utah 3rd District (Arbitration) 
State v, Alayna Corletl 
Utah 3rd District 
Robert Youngblood III v. Farmer's Insurance Co. 
Utah 3rd District (Arbitration) 
Gerald Vaughn v, Darin Anderson 
Utah 3rd District 
Gary Madrid v. Gene R. Brown and Aspen Technologies, Inc, 
Utah 3rd District 
Linda Greco v, Salt Lake County 
United States District Court for Utah 
Omar Mullahkhel v. Kimcy Herink 
Utah 3rd District 
U.S.A. v. Douglas Rex Young 
U.S, District Court, District of Utah, Centra] Division 
Jan Bcrgeson Mctcalf v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
tn arbitration for Salt Lake County, Utah 
State v, Boupha 
Utah 2nd District 
Jack Dahl and Kim Duncan v. USA 
U.S, District Court, District of Utah, Central Division 
Steven Kadonsky v, USA 
U.S District Court, District of Utah. Central Division 
Debbie Wright v. Yockcy 
Utah 3rd District (Arbitration) 
R.K. Rothfeder, M,D. 
Expert Witness 
Case List 
Page 11 
State v, Maria Tiscareno 
Utah 3rd District (Summit County) - Injury trial 
State v, Warren Hales 
Utah 3rd District 
Bernardo Cruz, Roberta Bailon, & Carolina Bacca v. Guatemala 
Utah 3rd District Arbitration 
Murray City v. Richard Graves 
Murray Justice Court, Salt Lake County, Utah 
State v. Kenneth Gandee 
Utah 2*d District 
Keith Aran v. Bruce D. Dent 
Utah 3rd District (Summit County) 
Misty Orr v. Lebowski 
Utah 3rd District 
State v. Brian Olsen 
Utah lat District, Cache County 
Karen Hagen v. Schmidt Trucking Co. 
U,S. District Court, District of Utah. Central Division 
State v, Pere2 
Utah 3rd District 
State v. Adam Jeppson 
Utah 3rd District 
State v. Robert Adams 
Utah 2nd District, Weber County 
Dustin Sorensen & Matthew Wyllie v. Ricardo Vasquez 
Utah 3rd District 
State v, Tiscareno 
Utah 3rd District (Summit County) - Daubert Hearing 
Jack Dahl and Kim Duncan v. USA 
US District Court. District of Utah, Central Division (trial testimony) 
Huong Yu v. Lovato 
Utah 3rd District 
R.K Rcthfeder, M,D, 
Expert Witness 
Case Li3t 
Page 12 
Brandy Ward & Travis Loizos v Courtney Coleman 
Utah 3* District (Arbitration) 
State v Tiscareno 
Utah 3rd District (Summit County) - Retrial 
Lujan v, Vogelson 
Utah 3fd District 
In the Matter of Billy J Stringfieldffl 
Supenor Court of California County of San Diego 
Barry and Patricia Nielsen v Holly Mosier Jensen 
Utah 1* District 
Bomlla and Melgar v Gibbons 
Utah 3rd District (Arbitration) 
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COURT IN AND FOR 
SAL r LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT H\ o 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MIKE CORY BARBER, 
Defendant. 
WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 051901413 FS 
Honorable: Stephen L. Henroid 
COMES NOW Counsel, DAVID K. SMITH, and at the request of the Defendant, 
Withdraws as Counsel for the Defendant, MIKE CORY BARBER in the above-captioned 
matter. 
DATED this JJS_ day of March, 2006. 
V^  
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ENTRY OF 
APPEARANCE to Counsel for the Plaintiff this ffr day of March, 2006, postage prepaid, and 
addressed as follows: 
DAVID E. YOCUM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
PAUL B. PARKER 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
MIKE CORY BARBER 
Inmate 
Adult Detention Center 
3415 South 900 West 
South Salt Lake, Utah 84115 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MIKE CORY BARBER, 
Defendant 
WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL 
Case No: 051901413 
Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD 
Date: 03/23/2006 
Clerk: lynm 
The court is in receipt of a pleading entitled Withdrawal of 
Counsel from defendant's attorney David K. Smith. The court will 
not allow defendant's counsel to withdraw at this time with pending 
court dates. A Pre Trial Conference is set for April 3, 2006 @ 
9:00 a.m. and Mr. Smith is expected to attend. 
Page 1 
Case No: 051901413 
Date: Mar 23, 2 0 06 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 051901413 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail MIKE CORY BARBER 
DEFENDANT 
Adult Detention Center 
3415 South 900 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Mail STATE OF UTAH 
PLAINTIFF , UT 
Mail DAVID K SMITH 
ATTORNEY DEF 
6925 UNION PARK CENTER STE 
600 
MIDVALE UT 84 047 
Dated this <^£j_ day of \fitnK '•o6l 52-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff; 
V 
MIKE CORY BARBER, 
Defendant. 
December 5, 2005 
April 3,2006 
June 6,2006 
Case No. 051901413 FS 
Appellate Court No. 20060663-CA 
: With Keyword Index 
MOTION TO QUASH 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE 
SENTENCING 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRJOD 
Page 1 
1 6 
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FILED 
yWH APPELLATE COURTS 
CAROLYN ERICKSON,CSR » 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER ™ 4 | $ P 
1775 East Ellen Way ,4 ^ r ^ r " n , ) R T S 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
TO) 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - APRIL 3, 2006 
HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
(Transcriber's note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
For the Plaintiff: PAUL B. PARKER 
For the Defendant: DAVID K. SMITH 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Are we on the Barber matter? 
MR. PARKER: We are, your Honor. 
MR. SMITH: Good morning, your Honor. ITm David 
Smith, here with Mr. Barber. 
MR. PARKER: Paul Parker for the State. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SMITH: Thank you, your Honor. 
Your Honor, my client had retained me to represent 
him on this matter; however, it appears that he is really not 
able to sustain the fees that are involved, and has indicated 
that he would like to go back to the public defender for 
representation. 
One of the problems, and I might just mention that, 
one of the problems that was involved in that was me because 
Ifve been quite ill lately and have probably been in the 
doctor!s office more than ITve been in my office; but we do 
recognize the trial is scheduled for the 18th of this month 
and so the request would be, on behalf of Mr. Barber, that he 
16 
be a llowed to go back 
representation. 
say? 
your 
cont 
with 
and 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
BARBER: 
COURT: 
PARKER: 
to the public defender for 
Mr. Barber, do you have anything 
No. 
Mr. Parker? 
Well, of course, the difficulty 
Honor, here we are at the eve of trial and it 
inued several times. The defendant's had two 
the Legal Defender's Association and chose to 
retain private counsel. 
THE 
scheduled. 
MR. 
COURT: 
SMITH: 
continuing the trial 
THE COURT: 
Motion's denied. We'll go t 
Your Honor, would the Court 
date? 
I don't want to continue the 
has 
to 
is, 
been 
attorneys 
leave them 
o trial as 
consider 
trial 
date. This is set, we've taken up a lot of time on the case. 
You know you can't withdraw before the trial date's set. You 
have plenty of time to be ready, I don't want to continue the 
trial. 
MR. SMITH: All right. Thank you, your Honor. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
-c-
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 3 3 : : : B 
SALT LAKE COUNTY | y p j 
fty / 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CASE NO. 051901413 
(Appellate Case No. 20060663-CA) 
MIKE CORY BARBER, : 
Defendant. : 
This matter came before the Court on remand from the Court of 
Appeals for an evidentiary hearing to enter Findings of Fact as to 
whether trial counsel's actions in failing to adduce testimony from Dr. 
Rothfeder or some other expert concerning the injuries suffered by the 
2 year old child constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The 
Court having read all information contained in the court file and having 
conducted an evidentiary hearing on December 14, 2007, now renders the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 The State's expert testimony regarding the force behind the 
boy's injuries from three expert witnesses that the child's injuries were 
caused from force greater than that which would result in accidental 
falls was overwhelming, consistent and not equivocal. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
I^?C^ 
STATE V. BARBER PAGE 2 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
2 At trial, the State further presented evidence demonstrating 
defendant's course of conduct amounted to battery. 
3 Defense counsel did a thorough and competent job representing 
the defendant at trial. 
4 At trial, defense counsel: 
(a) Thoroughly covered the issue of whether the boy's 
injuries might have been caused by accidental falls on both direct and 
cross-examination. Defense counsel questioned the experts on cross-
examination about the possibility that the injuries may have resulted 
from accidental falls and rough play and biting by the child's sister. 
The cross-examination elicited sufficient doubt in the minds of the jury 
to conclude the defendant was not guilty of one of the charges against 
him. 
(b) Because defendant could not afford to hire an expert 
despite wanting to, defense counsel Jbia&sd eight character witnesses to 
testify as to defendant's character around children. 
(c) Defense counsel's cross-examination showed that he had 
fulfilled his duty to make reasonable investigations into the possibility 
that the child's injuries were sustained from some other source than 
battery by the defendant. 
STATE V. BARBER PAGE 3 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
5 At the evidentiary hearing, the Court heard testimony from the 
following: 
(a) David K. Smith, defendant's trial attorney, who testified 
that he wanted to hire an expert at trial, but could not afford to do so. 
(b) Dr. Robert K. Rothfeder. 
(i) Dr. Rothfeder testified on direct examination that 
in his expert opinion the child's injuries could have resulted from the 
trauma of a fall; it was possible that all three broken bones in the 
child's arms and clavicle could have resulted from the same accidental 
fall; that the mark on the child's right shoulder might have been caused 
by the child's sister; and that Dr. Rothfeder was available to testify 
at trial, that he is easy to find because he had not moved or changed his 
address between the time LDA contacted him about testifying at trial and 
the actual trial. Dr. Rothfeder presented no expert report. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 The Court finds defense counsel thoroughly addressed the 
issues relevant to defendant's defense despite not being able to hire an 
expert and that he made thorough and reasonable investigations and 
decisions based upon his professional judgment, which made calling an 
expert unnecessary. The Court finds that Dr. Rothfeder's evidence was 
STATE V. BARBER PAGE 4 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
not as credible as the State's evidence, was not compelling and didn't 
rise to the level of effectively controverting the State's evidence, and 
that therefore calling Dr. Rothfeder or another expert with similar 
testimony would have made no difference in the outcome of the trial. 
2 In the evidentiary hearing, the defendant did not show that 
his trial counsel's actions were not based properly on choices made by 
the defendant and information supplied by defendant. 
3 The evidence demonstrated defendant's inability to afford to 
hire an expert, which governed defense counsel's decision not to call any 
such expert. Under the circumstances, this was a reasonable decision. 
4 The Court does not agree with LDA's assertion that given this 
financial constraint, defense counsel should have moved to have LDA 
reappointed. Defense counsel respected defendant's decision not to have 
LDA defend him and made the strategic choice to pursue defendant's case 
in the manner set forth above. 
Dated this rO day of January, 2008^ -^ s?s=s^ ^ 
e>zg 
STATE V. BARBER PAGE 5 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
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1 specifically talked about a belief that the boy had fallen 
2 off the couch. What that says to me and in my opinion and I 
3 know Mr. Parker will disagree with this, if an expert 
4 testimony or an expert opinion made all the difference in the 
5 world to that jury and in fact on Count 1, actually acquitted 
6 based on that contention. Had we had expert testimony for 
7 Mr. Barber, it is possible that that verdict would have been 
8 different as well. I have no doubt that the doctors that you 
9 heard from today believe in their professional determination. 
10 They're competent. They're qualified. Every medical 
11 professional that you heard from today is without question in 
12 that regard but the bottom line is, not all of them got to 
13 stand before the jury, not all of them had the opportunity to 
14 explain their results. One of them didn't and that person 
15 could have helped Mr. Barber's case. That person could have 
16 said something that would have benefitted him. It may have 
17 worked, it may not have worked but the bottom line here is 
18 there was deficient legal performance. There was not 
19 appropriate representation. Mr. Barber did not get the 
20 benefit of effective assistance of counsel and given the 
21 totality of that evidence, there is ineffective assistance 
22 here and Mr. Barber is entitled to a new trial to fix that. 
23 THE COURT: I am going to prepare specific findings 
24 and get it out that Mr. Barber did not have inadequate 
25 J counsel. I remember this case very specifically. Mr. Smith 
64 
1 did a good job, in fact, he did a better job than I expected 
2 having known Mr. Smith for some 30 years. He presented the 
3 exact same defense Mr. Sleight testified that he would have 
4 presented. He called many witnesses. He cross examined all 
5 of the State's experts very thoroughly on the issue of 
6 whether these injuries could have been caused accidentally 
7 and I don't believe there's any way in the world that the 
8 jury could have reached a different verdict because Dr. 
9 Rothfeder or a similar expert opined in any way similar to 
10 what Dr. Rothfeder testified to today. I'll get you the 
11 written ruling. Thank you. 
12 MR. PARKER: Thank you. 
13 MS. PORTER: Thank you for your time, sir. 
14 | (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
15 
16 
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1 that with the Court, the only caveat being because tht's a 
2 letter that Ms. Seppi has seen and I have not, we would ask 
3 her permission redact any attorney/client privilege. 
4 THE COURT: Of course. 
5 MS. PORTER: Thank you, sir. 
6 In terms of beginning today, we call David Smith to 
7 the stand. 
8 DAVID SMITH 
9 having been first duly sworn, testified 
10 upon his oath as follows: 
11 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
12 BY MS. PORTER: 
13 Q Good afternoon, Mr. Smith. 
14 A Good afternoon. 
15 Q Would you state your name and spell your last name 
16 for the record, please? 
17 A David K. Smith, S-M-I-T-H. 
18 Q Mr. Smith, can you tell us what you do for a 
19 living? 
20 A I'm an attorney. 
21 Q What type of law do you practice? 
22 A Primarily Worker's Comp and Social Security 
23 Disability, some criminal, other miscellaneous. 
24 Q During the course of your employment as an attorney 
2 5 have you ever had the opportunity to represent a client by 
1 the name of Michael Barber? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q Can you tell us approximately when that 
4 representation took place? 
5 A No. Well over a year ago. 
6 Q Did Mr. Smith - were you aware in the course of 
7 that case if Mr. Barber had previously been represented by 
8 any other attorney? 
9 A I believe he was represented by a legal aide. 
10 Q Do you happen to remember the name of that person? 
11 A No. 
12 Q Now, tell us, were you able to take that case to 
13 trial? 
14 A It would have been a public defender - not legal 
15 aide, I'm sorry, misspoke. Say that again. 
16 Q In your representation of Mr. Barber did you take 
17 that case to trial? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q And I'm going ask you tell us a little bit about 
20 what the allegations were and what the defense was that you 
21 in. 
22 A The allegations were that he had intentionally 
23 caused harm to a young 3-year old boy, Dominique, his 
24 girlfriend's young son and that the charges were, I think 
25 I aggravated assault and the young boy had serious injury as a 
1 result. 
2 Q And at the trial what was the defense that you 
3 presented to the jury? 
4 A It was - the allegation or defense was that it was 
5 an accident, he'd fallen in the bathtub and likely fallen on 
6 the edge of the bathtub and there was a metal railing along 
7 the edge of the bathtub that he hit his head and injured 
8 himself. Either that or fallen in the tub and injured 
9 himself. 
10 Q In the course of that defense did you also talk 
11 about any other injuries in another part of the house? 
12 A Yes. A couple of days before he had jumped from a 
13 couch in the living room and injured himself when he had 
14 fallen and hit the brick fireplace and had broken an arm. 
15 Q And was that the defense that was run as it related 
16 to that injury? 
17 A Correct, it was that he was not physically present 
18 at the time and it was an accident as well. 
19 Q Mr. Smith, once you were retained by Mr. Barber in 
20 this matter did you receive a copy of the file from legal 
21 defenders? 
22 A Yes, I believe I did at least what they gave me. I 
23 don't know if it was the whole file but I received papers, 
24 yes. 
25 Q At any point did you become aware that the Legal 
1 Defender's Association had consulted with Dr. Robert 
2 Rothfeder? 
3 A No, I wasn't aware of that. 
4 Q During your trial preparation, did you consult with 
5 any experts? 
6 A I did not. 
7 Q Why was that? 
8 A There were no funds to do so. 
9 MR. PORTER: Your Honor, if I could have just a 
10 moment? 
11 THE COURT: Certainly. 
12 MS. PORTER: No further questions, thank you. 
13 CROSS EXAMINATION 
14 BY MR. PARKER: 
15 Q Did you make some efforts to read the file, review 
16 all the literature and assess this case? 
17 A Are you talking about the information I got from 
18 the prosecutor's office? 
19 Q I'm just talking about your defense file. Did you 
20 read through all the reports and information that you had? 
21 A I believe I read through everything I had. Well -
22 and I'll take that back. There were some medical files that 
23 I was delivered - that I received from the prosecutor's 
24 office, a large stack of them that I got just a day or two 
25 before trial and I really didn't have a chance to go through 
1 those carefully. 
2 Q But just to make sure I'm clear, you took the 
3 information that you had and assessed it? 
4 A Yes, uh-huh (affirmative). 
5 Q You looked for defenses? 
6 A Correct. 
7 Q You looked for the quality and quantity of the 
8 State's evidence? 
9 A I believe I tried to do that, yes. 
10 Q And even the stack of medical records, there was an 
11 earlier stacks that you received? 
12 A Yeah, there were previous medical records, yes, and 
13 reports. 
14 Q And would it be accurate to say that there was 
15 nothing in this new stack that at least gave you information 
16 you had not been aware of before? 
17 A I believe so, I can't be sure on that because I 
18 really didn't, before trial, I didn't have the opportunity to 
19 go through them carefully as I would liked to have done. It 
20 was just so close to trial and there were so many other 
21 things going on that I really didn't have a chance to go 
22 through those as well as I would like to have done. 
23 Q I assume that in addition to assessing this report, 
24 you also went out and talked to some of the defense 
25 witnesses? 
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at trial 
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medical 
children 
A 
Yes, we made an attempt to do that, yes. 
In fact, you had quite a number that you presented 
? 
Yes, there were a number. 
And most of those witnesses concerned not the 
evidence but whether or not your client treated 
kindly? 
Yes, that was part of the defense that he was a 
good person and had a love for children. 
Q And also had opportunities otherwise to babysit or 
take care of children but there was no evidence of abuse or — 
A Right, in his past he'd taken care of, I think it 
was relative's children and others and there was never any 
indication that he'd ever mistreated them. 
Q 
part of 
A 
defense, 
Would it be accurate to say that that was a large 
your defense was this characterization — 
I would say that was a significant part of the 
sure • 
MR. PARKER: Nothing further. 
MS. PORTER: A couple of followup questions, sir. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. PORTER: 
Q Mr. Smith, you indicated that you did not hire an 
expert in this case or investigate the potential for one 
because Mr. Barber didn't have the necessary funds, correct? 
1 A That's correct. 
2 Q Would an expert have been helpful in your opinion 
3 as his counsel in preparing your defense? 
4 A Oh, very much so because obviously we knew the 
5 prosecution had a defense, in fact had two defense - excuse 
6 me, had two prosecution witnesses that were experts and were 
7 going to testify regarding causation. 
8 Q Did you seek to obtain any special funds from the 
9 court given Mr. Barber's indigency at that time? 
10 A No, I did not. 
11 MS. PORTER: Thank you. Nothing further. 
12 MR. PARKER: Nothing further Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Smith. 
14 THE WITNESS: You're welcome. 
15 MS. PORTER: Thank you, Mr. Smith. 
16 Your Honor, the defense would noW call Dr. Robert 
17 Rothfeder. 
18 MR. PARKER: Your Honor, before we start this 
19 witness it sounds to me like we're running way faster than I 
20 predicted and I asked my witnesses to come at 2:30. May I 
21 have just a little time to call them and get them here a 
22 little earlier so we don't wait? 
23 THE COURT: Thank you, appreciate that. 
24 MR. PARKER: It'll just take a minute if I may, 
25 Your Honor. 
